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GENERAL ABSTRACT 
The dissertation investigates how consumer choices on food are affected by habit 
forming behaviors of consumers, public policy and the uncertainty of the risk from food 
safety hazards and strategic interaction with food processors. Three stand-alone analyses on 
consumer choice consist of empirical frameworks to estimate parameters of dynamic 
demand, the treatment effects on program participation, and an analytical approach to 
modeling downstream consumer’s and  upstream firm’s handling of food safety risk.  
The first analysis focuses on dynamics in household demand. Incorporating dynamics 
such as habit formation in analysis of food demand can make estimation more reliable and 
help to explain the “stickiness” in consumer demand behavior. Capturing this response is 
important for evaluating consumers’ response to new information about products – whether 
nutrition, food safety or other event. Scanner data allow many repeated observations of the 
same household so are ideal for analyzing the impact of habit on food demand. In addition to 
that, scanner data allow us to easily observe the presence of zero purchases. The presence of 
zero purchases is an important econometric issue in empirical modeling on food demand in 
the sense that ignoring the censoring issue can lead to biased estimation results. The first 
study investigates the impact of state dependence on dairy food demand using 2009 and 2010 
Nielsen HomeScan data. In this analysis, we take into account the censored nature of food 
expenditure data and employ a Bayesian procedure to estimate the dynamic demand models 
on dairy products. By controlling the individual heterogeneity in the model the source of 
endogeneity for the lagged dependent variable is removed. The empirical evidence of 
habitual behaviors particularly in milk demand provides support for considering a model with 
dynamics in a study of food demand. 
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The second analysis examines the relationship between The Special Supplemental 
Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) participation and purchases of 
WIC related foods during the period shortly after introduction of changes in the WIC 
package. We use Nielsen Homescan data 2008 to 2010to assess how participation in the WIC 
program relates to food expenditures by WIC eligible households. The research includes 
analysis of select food purchases by WIC eligible households – both of those reporting 
participation in the WIC program and those not participating in the program.  In our analysis, 
we concentrate our attention on selected whole grain foods in the WIC food package as these 
foods are prominent in the revised WIC food package and grain products are purchased by 
most households. A propensity score matching estimator was used for estimating treatment 
effects and difference-in-difference method was conducted to control the policy change in the 
2009 WIC package revision. The study contributes to current literature on WIC to confirm 
that the WIC package change in 2009 had a significant influence on WIC participating 
households to encourage greater whole grain expenditures relative to non-participating 
households.     
The third analysis concerns the uncertainty of the risk from food safety hazards and 
strategic interaction with food processors. Domestic water consumers in many developing 
countries that boil water before use are presumably concerned about quality control on the 
part of upstream water authorities. In this third analysis, we investigate strategic incentives 
for food safety efforts by upstream food processors and downstream consumers. The 
strategic setting is where food processors move first and consumers react to perceptions 
about processor behavior. We consider two technological environments in which food safety 
is assured: i) weakest-link where both processor and consumer behavior must succeed; ii) 
ix 
 
 
best-shot where it suffices for efforts by either party to succeed. We study privately optimal 
behavior under negligence and strict liability rules, and also investigate the role of consumer 
risk aversion. 
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CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
1.  Introduction 
Both public health workers as well as policymakers are concerned about the 
prevalence of obesity and other health problems associated with unhealthy dietary behaviors 
of consumers as well as the potential risk of food related illnesses. These health issues are 
substantially related to consumers’ choices about food -- from the decision making of 
consumers over food purchases to food handling practices. The choices and policies related 
to the consumer choices have become a concern for all: government, agricultural industries 
and consumers. Thus, taking a closer look in the consumer’s food related choices may be the 
starting point to approach these public health issues. The main objective of this dissertation is 
to explore the various factors that can influence consumer’s decision-making related to food, 
to examine the economic impacts of those factors on consumers’ food purchases and food 
practices and find the policy implications associated each analysis.   
Eating patterns and choices are important in prevention of health problems and 
improving health status. Many of the choices can be explained by investigating market 
demand for food. Analysis of demand is of considerable interest not only for understanding 
consumer’s food choices but also for informing public policies under consideration. The first 
topic of this dissertation, presented in Chapter 2, explores how habitual behaviors related to 
food purchases contribute to the consumer’s responses to the food prices in food demand. We 
consider a demand model with dynamics to examine the association between past and current 
purchases of food as it is supported from the empirical evidence of habitual behaviors in 
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demand. Nielsen 2009 and 2010 HomeScan data are used in the estimation process of the 
dynamic food demand and selected food groups are dairy products. 
In analysis of household level data, one of the main empirical challenges is the 
presence of zero purchases. Generally, households do not purchase or consume all goods 
available in the market in the time period observed, and this is often true for food products. 
Ignoring the censoring issue on food consumption data can lead to biased estimation results.  
Also accounting for dynamic aspects that arise from habit formation among other reasons can 
also make the demand analysis more reliable. 
In this chapter, we take into account the censored nature of food expenditure data. 
The censoring arises when households do not purchase or consume all goods available in the 
market in the time period observed. This leads to censoring of the dependent variable in the 
estimation of demand or consumption equations.  We also control for unobserved household 
heterogeneity to estimate dynamic demand for dairy products. Unobserved individual 
heterogeneity arises when estimating the effect of habit. By accounting for unobserved 
heterogeneity in micro data, we can avoid overestimation of the underlying habit formation. 
For estimating dynamic food demand, the chapter uses the dynamic Tobit panel model with 
unobserved household heterogeneity. The estimation results show that habit-forming effects 
on dairy demands exist conditional on unobserved household heterogeneity. In particular, the 
empirical evidence on milk expenditure shows the largest habit forming effect in milk 
demand.  
Consumer choices on food purchases are influenced by also public policies through 
participation in food assistance programs. The Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for 
Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) is one of the largest food assistant programs in the 
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United States and is designed to enhance the foods eaten by target, at risk women, infants and 
young children. The program provides healthy food (WIC package food), nutrition 
counseling, and access to health services for low-income infants, children up to age five, and 
pregnant, breastfeeding, and postpartum women for improving health of people at nutritional 
risk. The second topic of this dissertation, presented in Chapter 3, addresses how 
participating in the WIC program affects household food purchases. We use scanner data in 
the analysis. 
Investigating the effect of participating in the WIC program on food choices is an 
important aspect to understanding the role of the WIC in assuring improved long run health 
outcomes among program participants. As the WIC program aims to improve healthy eating 
behaviors of target people, the analysis of consumption patterns of WIC participants allows 
us to see whether the program leads to improved healthy food purchases. And this would be 
one way to measure the effectiveness of the program. There are relatively few recent studies 
about WIC effects on food consumption. Other studies have examined the impacts of WIC 
on health status and dietary conditions of the target population.  
Existing literature on the WIC program finds that household decisions are important 
in evaluating the use of WIC provided foods, and suggests that there is a need for 
information about overall WIC household choices, expenditures and behaviors. In this sense, 
this paper contributes by providing an analysis of the impact of the WIC program on 
household food expenditures. The chapter includes: (1) analysis of the reliability of the WIC 
participation variable; (2) identification of subgroups of survey households by WIC income 
eligibility criteria and type of WIC individuals in the household; and (3) a comparison of 
select food purchases between eligible WIC reporting and eligible WIC not-reporting 
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households. The empirical analysis of food expenditures for WIC participating households is 
conducted by comparing the WIC participating households to eligible, non-participating 
households. We use a propensity score matching estimator to estimate the treatment effects 
on whole grain expenditures and the difference-in-difference method to control the policy 
change in the 2009 WIC package revision. The 2009 change in WIC package made a number 
of changes to the packing and included whole grain products. The results show that there was 
a significant impact of WIC participation on whole grain expenditure over three consecutive 
years and the WIC package change implemented in October 2009 was positively associated 
with this treatment effects in the year following its implementation.  
Addressing the problem of the existence of food related risk presents another 
important factor that influences on consumers’ decision making related to food. The risk of 
foodborne illnesses can be reduced by consumers’ practice toward food safety based upon 
how the consumers perceive the risk. The decision on food safety efforts can be made 
together with food choices before consumers purchase food or considered as a separate 
decision after food choices had been made. In either way, consumers’ protection incentives 
are heavily related to the food safety efforts by upstream food processors. Modeling the 
decision-making process of consumers on food safety has not received much attention in the 
literature.  
The objective of the third topic of this dissertation, Chapter 4, is to examine how the 
interaction between downstream consumers and upstream firms influences the consumer’s 
incentives to exert effort to reduce food safety risk, and to identify how policy rules may 
affect the interaction. Economic analysis through modeling of the consumers’ protection 
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incentives on the risk of food-borne illnesses addresses an important option for food safety 
control and can provide a rigorous theoretical foundation for policy implications.  
In Chapter 4, we construct a Stackelberg model with asymmetric timing in moves, 
allowing the upstream agents to move first and consumers make decisions later as second-
movers. Our analysis is distinct from earlier work by allowing self-protective incentive to 
reduce the probability of a loss as we directly apply risk aversion on the consumer’s part. The 
uncertainty that is an essential feature of food safety events has implications for consumer 
behavior. Finally the timing and risk aversion dimensions in our model give us the 
opportunity for policy analyses not available in earlier works. 
In our analysis, we contrast food safety incentives and outcomes across two 
dimensions, technology and liability assignment. Food safety effort by each party can be 
either a success or a failure based on the assumption of statistical independence between the 
success probabilities. Two very different technologies between effort outcomes and food 
safety outcomes are considered: weakest link and best shot. In the weakest link, if one or 
both of two actions fails then the outcome is a failure, i.e., a food safety event occurs. In best 
shot if either or both of the actions is a success then the food is safe. We examine how the 
sort of technical interaction between upstream and downstream efforts affects the behavior 
strategies in response to food safety risk. In the second contrast set forth under different 
liability rules, two liability rules are considered: strict liability and negligence in a bilateral 
accident setting. Thus, the incentives under four settings (weakest link, best shot) ⨉ (strict 
liability, negligence) are developed.  
By backward induction, we solve the expected utility maximization problem for a 
downstream consumer in Stage II and for the upstream processor’s Stage I cost minimization 
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problem to obtain the optimal levels of preventative effort. After solving for the Stackelberg 
equilibrium in each case, we provide comparative statics to ascertain strategic interactions 
between both efforts as well as how consumer risk aversion affects each effort type. The 
findings show that the strategic interactions under different technologies, the consumer reacts 
differently to an increase in processor food safety effort. Several of our findings might be 
viewed as counterintuitive and these stem partly from the self-protective nature of food 
safety efforts.   
 
2. Organization of the dissertation  
This dissertation provides the economic analysis on consumers’ decision making over 
food purchases and practices when they face internal and external factors that affect their 
choices. While each of these chapters can be a stand-alone study, they are all dedicated to an 
investigation of consumer choice on food. A brief overview of the remainder of this 
dissertation is outlined as follows: 
• Chapter 2 examines the effects of habit-forming behaviors on demand for dairy 
products by incorporating dynamic aspects in the demand equations. 
• Chapter 3 conducts the estimation for the treatment effect of the WIC program to 
investigate the relationship between WIC program participation and purchases of WIC 
related foods. The period investigated includes the period shortly after introduction of 
changes in the WIC package.  
• Chapter 4 develops a Stackelberg model with self-protection motives to examine the 
interaction among downstream consumers and upstream firms in the presence of uncertainty 
of food safety risk, and explores how the food safety incentives and outcomes across 
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different dimensions of technology and liability rules are determined in a strategic model 
setting. 
• Chapter 5 highlights the findings and implications of the three investigations 
addressed in this dissertation and outlines future directions. 
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CHAPTER 2. DYNAMIC FOOD DEMAND AND HABIT FORMAING BEHAVIORS: 
BAYESIAN APPROACH TO A DYNAMIC TOBIT PANEL DATA MODEL WITH 
UNOBSERVED HETEROGENEITY
1
 
 
1. Introduction 
Habit formation 
Eating behaviors and habits contribute to health outcomes and thus understanding 
factors associated with eating choices is important to efforts to protect and improve health 
status. Food habits are also important in explaining observed “stickiness” in food demand 
when consumers receive new information about food safety and risk. Food choices can be 
explained, in large part, by investigating market demand for food. The empirical evidence of 
habitual behaviors in demand provides support for considering a model with dynamics in a 
study of the food demand. Following Pollack (1970), habit forming goods are defined as 
goods associated with preferences for which current consumption behavior relies on the past 
consumption experience. Therefore, lagged dependent variables are used to show how habit 
formation influences the demand.  
A number of empirical studies in food demand have analyzed habit formation using 
macro and micro level panel data. Habit forming behaviors are found in various categories of 
food products including products such as beverages, meats, cereal, cheese, ketchup and 
snacks, as well as food at home, food away from home and aggregate food (Zhen et al, 2010; 
Wohlgenant and Zhen, 2006; Thunström, 2009; Arnade et al., 2008; Seetharaman, 2004; 
Richards et al., 2007; Heien and Durham, 1991; Naik and Moore, 1996). Although food 
                                                 
1
 An earlier version was prepared and presented as a Selected Paper at the Agricultural & Applied Economics 
Association’s 2013 AAEA & CAES Joint Annual Meeting, Washington, DC, August 4-6, 2013. 
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demand models generally exhibit habit formation, the evidence of habit formation varies over 
empirical methods used (Daunfeldt et al., 2011). For example, Naik and Moore (1996) use a 
single demand functions model and show habit formation in individual food consumption 
using aggregated food consumption of household panel data. In contrast, Dynan (2000) uses 
a life-cycle consumption model and finds no evidence of habit formation using the same data 
set. And, Browning and Collado (2007) find habit formation for consumption of ‘food 
outside the home’ while there is no state dependence for ‘food at home’. Other important 
example is found in studies of non-alcoholic beverages. Zhen et al. (2011) examine state 
dependence over beverage demand and find strong evidence for habit formation.  
As an alternative to the traditional state dependence approach, recent work of 
Adamowicz and Swait (2012) evaluates a conceptual framework of decision strategy which 
would minimize cognitive effort using panel data.  They find significant evidence of a 
habitual decision strategy particularly in the case of catsup which has a relatively longer 
inter-purchase period while they find evidence of variety-seeking preference in the case of 
yogurt.  
Controlling for the unobserved individual heterogeneity is one distinct issue that 
arises when estimating the effect of habit. Often, the literature on habit formation is 
concerned with possible sources of persistence in consumer’s behavior and addresses 
whether the association between current and past consumption reflects state dependence or 
individual heterogeneity (Naik and Moore, 1996; Carrasco et al., 2005: Browning and 
Collado, 2007). Failure to control for unobserved heterogeneity in micro data may lead to 
overestimation of the underlying habit formation. In order to distinguish between 
heterogeneity among individuals and the effect of habit, researchers have estimated models 
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that include fixed effects to explain the time invariant unobserved heterogeneity across 
households and provide a strong tool for testing the habit formation hypothesis. Naik and 
Moore (1996) conclude that controlling for heterogeneity reduces estimated habit effects; the 
importance of accounting for time invariant unobserved individual effects has been shown in 
Carrasco et al. (2005).    
Most of the literature referenced above on habit formation employs dynamic linear 
panel data models to estimate dynamic demand. In the linear models with unobserved 
individual effects, the unobserved effects can be eliminated by using an appropriate 
transformation such as differencing; instrumental variables (IV) can be implemented to 
estimate the transformed model in a generalized method of moments (GMM) framework. To 
date, significant progress has been achieved in estimating unbiased and consistent estimators 
and improving the efficiency of the estimators (Anderson and Hsiao, 1982; Arellano and 
Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover, 1995; Baltagi, 1995; Bond and Hahn, 1999; Arellano and 
Honore, 2001; Hsiao, 2003). 
Empirical challenges: Censoring 
Generally, households do not purchase or consume all goods available in the market 
in the time period observed. It is a well-known econometric issue in microdata based on 
surveys of household expenditures that households do not purchase all goods available but 
only some of them in the observed time period. This leads to censoring of the dependent 
variable in the estimation of demand or consumption equations. While this zero consumption 
issue can be represented as a corner solution in utility maximization (Perali and Chavas, 
2000), we can also find various reasons for a household to make a decision to purchase none 
of the good (zero purchases). For example, people may simply avoid certain products or, if 
11 
 
 
 
they do make purchases, do so infrequently according to their lifestyles. Alternatively, the 
decision related to infrequent purchases which are observed as zero purchases in a given 
period of time, may be related to the capacity of storing products and use of inventories. 
Other non-purchase decisions may be associated with factors related to information about the 
safety of products or the dietary environment. This type of response would occur as a change 
in behavior from the previous responses. With any possible reason, if there is a significant 
fraction of the zero observations in the dependent variable, analysis that uses a conventional 
regression approach may lead to inappropriate biased and inconsistent estimators.  
In order to deal with censored data, several approaches to demand systems have been 
taken in the econometric literature and include the Kuhn-Tucker model, Amemiya-Tobin 
model, Heckman’s two-step method and a Bayesian approach (Wales and Woodland, 1983; 
Lee and Pitt, 1986; Tobin, 1958; Amemiya, 1974; Heien and Wessells, 1990; Shonkwiler and 
Yen, 1999; Tiffin and Arnoult, 2010; Ishdorj and Jensen, 2010; Kasteridis et al., 2011).  
For estimating dynamic food demand, this paper uses the dynamic Tobit panel model 
with unobserved individual heterogeneity. The non-linear nature of treating censored panel 
data makes the estimation even more difficult along with some complexity that arises from 
the two main features of the dynamic panel data model: the individual specific effects and 
lagged dependent variables. The literature on nonlinear panel models, particularly in the case 
of censored regression, has been developed to overcome the difficulties of differencing away 
the unobserved effects and dealing with initial conditions (Honore, 1993; Hu, 2002, Hsiao, 
2003; Honore and Hu, 2004; Wooldridge, 2005; Li and Zheng, 2008). 
In this paper, we apply the Bayesian approach to estimate a dynamic censored dairy 
food demand. We selected the dairy and eggs food group because most households purchase 
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some of these products and it is a sector of interest in food and health programs. In micro 
panel data, the pairs of observations corresponding to a given individual are likely to be 
correlated and individual specific effect are introduced in the models to account for this fact. 
The form of the correctly specified likelihood function might be complex and this leads to 
computational difficulties. The Bayesian approach – inference from the parameters’ posterior 
distribution conditioned on the observations -- is our alternative to maximum likelihood 
estimation as it offers computational convenience through the simulation methods. One of 
the standard Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithms that can be easily applied to 
high dimensional problems is the Gibbs sampler. This method is used in the iteration 
procedure for sampling the parameters from the conditional posterior distributions.  
The main contribution of this paper is to estimate a dynamic demand model by using 
a Bayesian approach, accounting for censored data. We apply the estimation procedures to 
the dairy group, a group that has relatively well defined products. Gibbs sampling is 
conducted to deal with the censored data. 
 
2. Empirical Model 
The dynamic single demand equations are estimated as a dynamic Tobit panel data 
model.  Following methods used in related studies, we consider a dynamic unobserved 
effects Tobit model in the form  
TtHhniucygzy ihtihtihihtiht ,...,1,,...,1,,...,1],)(,0max[ 1,    (1) 
2
, 1 ,0,..., , , ~ Normal(0, )
iid
iht ih t ih ih ih iuu y y z c     
where ihty is the censored response variable of interest on the 
thi good by the thh household in 
time period t  which depends on the explanatory variables ihtz , the lags of the dependent 
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variable 1ihty  and the unobserved individual heterogeneity ihc  (Hu, 2002; Wooldridge, 2005; 
Li and Zheng, 2008). As Heckman (1981) notes, in order to interpret observed persistence in 
consumption as the habit effect corresponding to the case of true state dependence, we allow 
the intercept in equation (1) to vary across households to control for omitted factors.  
We assume that the error terms, ihtu , are i.i.d. normally distributed conditional on 
( *
0 ,ihy ih
T
tiht cz ,}{ 1 ) and not serially correlated in the model. By accounting for the unobserved 
individual effects and the assumptions on error terms, the model exhibits strict exogeneity 
on ihtz . In other words, the possible dynamic feedback from realizations ihz  
on past and 
future time periods to the current realizations of the dependent variables is removed in the 
model so that the dynamic nature of the model is only from the presence of the lagged 
dependent variables (Hu, 2002). 
The model in equation (1) is well suited to corner solution applications, however the 
model with lagged censored dependent variable is not applicable for data censoring 
applications (Wooldridge, 2002; 2005). As we are to account for a data censoring case, the 
lagged latent dependent variable will be placed in the function )(g  as was done in Hu (2002) 
and we specify the model in the current paper as follows: 
 
ihtihiht ucyzy tihiht   
**
1,
       (2) 
where
*
ih t
y represents the latent quantities of product i  purchased by household h  in tht
 
month, 
, 1
*
ih t
y

is the lagged latent quantities of product i  purchased by household h  in ( 1)tht 
 
month and ihtz represents the  vector of covariates of interest: a set of own and cross prices, 
set of demographic variables along with total expenditures over all food categories(food at 
home) and seasonal effects.  
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As the unobserved individual heterogeneity ihc  is a nuisance parameter, specifying 
the distribution of ihc and its relationship with ihtz is needed to complete the model setup. We 
follow the specification of the relationship between the individual effects and the initial 
conditions in Li and Zheng (2008).  Li and Zheng make an assumption of the following 
conditional mean dependence of the ihc on the initial conditions and observed strictly 
exogenous variables 
),(],[ 0,0, ihihihihih zyhazycE   
                                                         (3)
 
where a
 
is a constant, )(h is a function of  the vector of initial values of the dependent 
variable
0ihy  and a matrix of time-invariant covariates ihz  which only vary over different 
households and   is a vector of corresponding parameters.2 An independent relationship 
between 0,ihy and ihz is assumed. We set ihih zz   
where ihz is the average of ihtz over the 
entire time path as in Chib and Jeliazkov(2006).
3
 Following the specification of 
0 0 1 2( , )ih ih ih ihh y z y z    in Li and Zheng (2008), we rewrite (3) as 
ihihihih zyc   210, ,  
2
0 , ~ Normal (0, )
iid
ih ih ih iy z           (4) 
where ih is an error term in the auxiliary equation.
4
 This specification of the unobserved 
individual heterogeneity allows its linear correlation with the initial observations of the 
dependent variable and the set of exogenous explanatory variables.    
 
                                                 
2 Alternatively, ihz can be the set of all explanatory variables in all time periods, ihz = ),...,( 1 ihTih zz with 
multidimensional ihz as in Wooldridge (2005).  
3 Time-invariant variables such as race or ethnicity cannot be in both ihtz and ihz for identification purposes (Li and Zheng; 
2008). 
4
 For the estimation of the model, we assume that
*
0 0ih ihy y , initial values of dependent variable to be 
uncensored following Hu (2002). 
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3. Estimation 
We fit the following dynamic Tobit model with the unobserved individual 
heterogeneity  
ihtihiht ucxy iht  
*   (or uCXY e  * ) 
where
 
),( * 1,  tihihtiht yzx , 
''' ),(  
 
and 2
, 1 ,0,..., , , ~ Normal(0, )
iid
iht ih t ih ih ih iuu y y z c   
ihihih rc    (or   RC )  
where
 0,
( ,1)ih ih ihr y z , 
''
2
'
1 ),(    
and 20 , ~ Normal (0, )
iid
ih ih ih iy z   
using a Bayesian approach by drawing samples from the posterior distribution of the 
parameters in the model.
5
 One thing we are concerned about is that our latent variables 
T
tihy 1
* }{   and ihc  are not completely observable. So, we need to employ data augmentation 
suggested by Albert and Chib (1993) to replace the zero observations with fitted values for 
latent dependent variables and update nuisance parameters ihc through Bayesian Markov 
Chain Monte Carlo algorithm (MCMC) iterations. We will discuss the data augmentation in 
the Gibbs sampling algorithm.  
Sampling density and priors  
Recall that the distribution of ihtu and equation (2) give us the sampling density of the 
dependent variables conditioned on the latent variables. In addition to other variables, we 
write the model as follows: 
                                                 
5
 )',...,,...,,...,( )()1()(1
)1(
1
Tt
iH
t
iH
Tt
i
t
i
e ccccC   
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Before we discuss how the model can be fit using the MCMC, we introduce the 
specifications on priors following Li and Zheng (2008):  
' ' '( , ) ~ improper flat prior   6 
1 1
2
1
~ gamma( , )
2 2iu
N R

 or 
1 2
1
1 1
2
22
1 1 iu
N
R
iuiu
e


 
  
    
 
    (6) 
Gibbs sampling from the posterior 
Combining the model given in (2) and the prior information in (6), we can determine 
what the posterior conditional distributions of the parameters look like. We use the Gibbs 
sampler - one simple and effective sampler in the MCMC algorithms - to generate samples 
from the posterior. We set initial values for  , and 2iu , and the Gibbs iteration algorithm 
proceeds in the following steps: 
Step1: For each Hh ,...,1 and Tt ,...,1 such that ,0ihty  generate
*
ihty  from the truncated 
normal distribution on the interval [-∞, 0] with mean iht ihx r  and variance 
22
iiu   conditional on 
2, , , , ,iht iht ih iy x r    and 
2
iu . 
                                                 
6
 “For example, a uniform prior distribution on the real line, , for , is an improper prior. 
Improper priors are often used in Bayesian inference since they usually yield noninformative priors and proper 
posterior distributions.”  (SAS/STAT(R) 9.2 User's Guide, Second edition). Accessed at 
http://support.sas.com/documentation/cdl/en/statug/63033/HTML/default/viewer.htm#statug_introbayes_sect00
4.htm  
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Step2: Update 2iu and  by drawing from the joint posterior distribution of 2
1
iu
and 
 conditional on data and other parameters and marginalized over each other.   
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Step3: For each Hh ,...,1 , update ihc from the normal distribution with mean 
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Step4: Update  by drawing from the posterior distribution conditional on ,ih ihr c and 
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4. Data  
The dynamic food demand model is estimated by using the Nielsen HomeScan data 
for the period 2009 and 2010.
 
The data are based on a representative sample of U.S. 
households that report on all food purchase for each shopping trip. The food items are 
recorded by the unique Uniform Product Code (UPC) using a scanning device and the 
information is collected on weekly basis. The initial dataset consists of dry grocery 
purchases, dairy products purchases, UPC-produce, meat and frozen products purchases, and 
random weight purchase data. “Household expenditures on food at home” are generated by 
using the aggregated expenditures on dairy, dry grocery, frozen and random weight products 
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purchase data.  The data files also contain information on household socio-economic and 
demographic characteristics and purchase information by purchase date, product module, 
UPC number, size, quantity, multipack, use of coupon and price paid. The demographic 
characteristics matched with the household purchases data include household income, age, 
education and employment of household head, race and ethnicity, marital status, and 
presence of children.  
The total number of households reporting any food purchase in the 2009 and 2010 
scanner data is over 60,000 households. Of those, more than 59,000 households report some 
food purchases at least 10 months of a year. Among those households, 36,256 households 
report dairy products both in 2009 and 2010. This was our sample of interest. The dairy file 
includes both dairy products and shell eggs. We refer to this as the “dairy” products group. In 
order to have a sample size that would simplify the estimation process we took a random 
sample of 3,626 households for our analytic sample, which is approximately 10% of 36,256 
households.  
In Table 2.1, the dairy products are categorized into four groups of products – milk, 
cheese, egg and other dairy products. Table 2.1 provides the number of households who 
purchase each group of products and the percentages of zero purchases of each group. The 
majority of the households who reported any grocery purchase information for at least 10 
months have purchased each group of products at least once in 2009 and 2010. As we 
consider a month as a time unit out of 24 months’ time period based on the expected average 
shelf life of dairy products; the number of observations is the number of households times 
24.
7
 Of our final sample, 40 percent of observations on egg purchases and 29 percent of 
                                                 
7
 Note that the shelf life of cheese might last longer than any other dairy products in the freezer. This may 
influence the results of estimation on cheese demand.   
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observations on cheese purchases had no expenditures on the respective products while 17 
percent of observations of milk data were zero purchases. As we see some households that 
have zero purchase for each category of products, accounting for censoring in the estimation 
is a reasonable concern.  
Table 2.2 provides information on the distribution of average quantities and imputed 
prices (unit values) for the four product groups. We calculated regional prices as the regions’ 
households’ prices after we accounted for the reported product units: ounces, fluid ounces 
and count measures. The price of each group of products for each region is imputed as the 
unit value defined as the sum of households’ expenditure ($) in each region for the group of 
products divided by quantity purchased in ounces. In Table 2.2, monthly average quantities 
purchased of each category and prices (unit values) are reported. As shown in the table, 
cheese and other dairy products are more expensive than milk and eggs on a per ounce basis.  
Table 2.3 presents the descriptions of variables and provides the calculated means and 
standard deviations of the final sample. Demographic variables include the household’s 
income, total food (at home) expenditures, household’s age, presence of children (kids), 
employment status of female household head and race and ethnicity. The race and ethnicity 
are collected from the sample person, and may not reflect the race and ethnicity of all 
members of the household when race and ethnicity are mixed. The household’s income is 
recorded as a categorical variable. In our estimation we use the household’s monthly 
expenditure calculated over all food groceries as an explanatory variable, instead of reported 
income (Benson et al., 2002). In doing this, similar to Benson et al. (2002), the estimation 
results of the demand equations solve the second stage of a two-stage budgeting problem 
based upon weak separability over households’ preferences. Households allocate the total 
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food expenditures monthly among purchases of dairy products and non-dairy food products 
after the first allocation of income among purchases of food at home and other goods or 
services. Using total food expenditure also reduces possible endogeneity posed from use of 
the dairy group expenditure as a measure of total expenditures or income. We use the 
information of household’s income to compare the demand of low income households to the 
demand of high income households. The presence of children, race and ethnicity, and the 
employment status of female household head were considered as binary variables. 
The estimation proceeded as follows: the numbers of observations for each data file were 
iterated 10,000 times; the first 5,000 iterations were set to be burn-in periods.    
 
5. Results  
Table 2.4 presents the results from the estimation of the dynamic Tobit model with 
individual heterogeneity on purchases of dairy products reporting the posterior means and 
standard deviations of parameters for the prices and demographic variables. The probabilities 
of being positive that is loosely comparable to the notion of “significance” are also reported 
for each set of parameters estimated for the demand model. The parameter estimates from the 
main equation and auxiliary equation are shown in Table2.4. The effect of habit persistence 
is seen in the parameter value of Yt-1. We find strong evidences that past purchases of each 
dairy category play an important role in current purchases of each group of products, as the 
estimates of all four demand equations present similar positive effects for the lagged 
dependent variable with probability of being positive 1.0. Even though we controlled for the 
effect of unobserved heterogeneity, we observe the presence of habit formation in the 
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purchases of dairy products. In particular, milk demand exhibits the strongest habit forming 
behavior; we find less effect from the lagged dependent variable on cheese demand.
8
  
As shown in Table2.4, the estimates of the own price responses for all dairy demands 
are negative signed; most of the own price response have probability of being positive near 0 
except for eggs. The estimated response to total food expenditures is positive for all products 
as we expected, and with probability of being positive 1.0. The presence of children in all age 
ranges and total food expenditures have substantial positive impacts on milk demand. The 
effect of having kids on milk consumption is particularly large in the households that have 
children under 5 years of age.  Some interesting result from the estimates for the auxiliary 
equation is that there is a positive correlation between the unobserved heterogeneity and 
Hispanic ethnicity in all dairy demands.  
In order to avoid possible correlation expected between total expenditure and income, 
we conducted an additional analysis by separating the sample into two income groups of 
households and ran the same estimation process on milk products only. We converted 
midpoints of categorical income ranges into estimated income and computed poverty-income 
ratios. Low income household is defined if having income less than 200% of the poverty 
income level and high income household has income more than the cut-off level.
9
 The results 
in Table 2.5 show that the price and total food expenditure responses of low income 
                                                 
8
 When it comes to estimating habit effects of food demand, perishability and storage motives together with the 
length of lags may also matter to state dependence. As the length of lags was to be set to be consistent with the 
length of shelf life for dairy products except for cheese products, we are not overly concerned about controlling 
storage behaviors from state dependence. The weakest impact of the lagged variable is for cheese demand 
among dairy demands and this result may relate to the product’s longer length of self life. That is, there may be 
possible storage behaviors in cheese purchases with the result that the habit formation factor may possibly be 
underestimated.      
9
 The official cut-off applied in some nutrition programs (e.g., WIC) is 185%, although higher income 
households may qualify on the basis of Medicaid or other social assistance programs. We use 200% to include 
“potentially” eligible households.   
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households are more responsive than those of high income households. Also, the effect of the 
presence of children is larger among the low income households.  
Uncompensated price and total food expenditure elasticities were calculated from the 
posterior parameters on prices and food expenditures and are provided in Table 2.6. Point 
estimates provided in each cell are the means of the Gibbs samples and the 95% credible 
intervals are given in parentheses. Corresponding to the probabilities of being positive in 
Table 2.4, most of the own-price elasticities and all the food expenditure elasticities are 
considered to be “significant” as 95% credible sets exclude zero. The own-price elasticities 
of each group are negative and inelastic which means that dairy products are necessary 
goods, as we expect. Demand for cheese is relatively more price responsive than the other 
products. In the case of egg demand, there is little evidence that most of the price elasticities 
are “significant” as the 95% credible sets include zero. Complementarity was found among 
the dairy products.
10
 In addition, the food expenditure elasticity estimates for each group are 
positive. We find some evidence of larger food expenditure elasticities for cheese and other 
dairy products than for milk and eggs. Both the higher and lower income households have 
similar inelastic milk demand patterns (see Table 2.7). Low income households exhibit more 
elastic price and expenditure responses for milk demand compared to the responses of the 
higher income households. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper investigates the impact of state dependence on dairy demand using Nielsen 
2009 and 2010 HomeScan data. The results of the estimation show that habit forming 
                                                 
10
 Note that as we estimate single demand equations, no restrictions such adding-up, symmetry and 
homogeneity were imposed. 
23 
 
 
 
behaviors exist for these products and are conditional on unobserved individual 
heterogeneity. As expected in estimating demand for particular product categories, problems 
of censoring appear in the micro-data. In this paper, we take into account the censored nature 
of food expenditure data and employ a Bayesian procedure to estimate the dynamic demand 
models on dairy products. By controlling the individual heterogeneity in the model, the 
source of endogeneity for the lagged dependent variable has been removed. The Bayesian 
estimation approach used reduces the burdens of having complicated computations through 
simulation methods.  
This research provides a unique contribution to a dynamic censored demand for food 
by applying Bayesian method to estimate habit effects using relatively recent household 
panel data. We examined the dairy foods group and find that most of the dairy products 
exhibit habit formation. These findings suggest that consumers of these products will be 
slower to adjust their purchase behavior. Subsequent analysis will expand the time period 
covered and examine responses to specific food safety recalls and product information. 
Additional product groups will be considered as well, including meats. Another area for 
extension of this work is to account for some correlation among the single equations by 
estimating demand as a demand system.  
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 Table 2.1 The Dairy Product Categories and Distribution for Sampled Households
a 
Product Category/Product Group Description # of HHs  
% of Zero 
Purchases* 
MILK 3565 17.7% 
CHEESE 3595 29.1% 
EGGS 3491 40.9% 
OTHER 
BUTTER AND MARGARINE 
COT CHEESE, SOUR CREAM, TOPPINGS 
DOUGH PRODUCTS 
PUDDING, DESSERTS-DAIRY 
SNACKS, SPREADS, DIPS-DAIRY 
YEAST 
YOGURT 
3613 
  
19.5% 
  
Total Dairy 3626   
a
 Note: Percentage of observed month with zero purchases over all households purchasing 
each category of product. Data are reported on the 10% randomly drawn sample of reporting 
households from Nielsen HomeScan household data 2009-2010.   
 
 
 
 
Table 2.2 Distributions of Monthly Average Quantities and Prices  
for Sampled Households
a
  
Variable Unit Mean Std. Min. Max. 
Milk Ounce 94.20 77.24 0.00 1382.40 
Cheese Ounce 10.46 10.83 0.00 320.00 
Egg Ounce 17.18 18.82 0.00 761.92 
Other dairy Ounce 13.52 14.77 0.00 288.00 
P_milk $/oz 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.06 
P_cheese $/oz 0.28 0.03 0.20 0.45 
P_egg $/oz 0.07 0.01 0.04 0.12 
P_other $/oz 0.12 0.02 0.08 0.22 
a 
Note: Data are reported on the 10% randomly drawn sample of  
reporting households from Nielsen HomeScan household data 2009-2010. 
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Table 2.3 Definitions and Statistics on the Variables for Sampled Households
a 
Variable Mean Std.Dev Minimum Maximum 
Household income 59976 38795 5000 200000 
Sum_expd Monthly total food expenditure 155.73 189.24 0 3150.25 
Household age Maximum age of the two household's heads 59.67 12.58 25 110 
      
Binary Variables (equal 1 if following conditions met, and 0 otherwise) 
Kids Household has a kid under 5 year olds 0.037 0.19 0 1 
Skids 
Household has a kid between 5 and 11 year 
olds 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Bkids 
Household has a kid between13 and 17 year 
olds 
0.07 0.26 0 1 
Emplf Female household head is employed 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Black Household’s sampled person’s race is black 0.08 0.28 0 1 
White Household’s sampled person’s race is white 0.86 0.35 0 1 
Hispanic 
Household's sampled person’s ethnicity is 
Hispanic 
0.04 0.20 
0 1 
Summer Purchasing month is in June to August 0.25 0.43 0 1 
Winter Purchasing month is in November to January 0.25 0.43 0 1 
a 
Note: Data are reported on the 10% randomly drawn sample of reporting households from Nielsen HomeScan  
household data 2009-2010. 
 
  
 
 
 
  
3
1
 
Table 2.4 Bayesian Dynamic Tobit Estimation Results for each Dairy Group’s Demand  
  Milk     Cheese     Other Dairy   Eggs   
Main Equation Mean Std Prob>0 Mean Std Prob>0 Mean Std Prob>0 Mean Std Prob>0 
Yt-1 0.538 0.002 1.000 0.177 0.005 1.000 0.284 0.003 1.000 0.246 0.003 1.000 
log(P_milk) -12.886 1.296 0.000 -0.824 0.286 0.002 -1.593 0.333 0.000 -0.222 0.445 0.307 
log(P_other) 3.556 1.978 0.966 -0.459 0.411 0.134 -1.618 0.500 0.001 0.173 0.676 0.593 
log(P_cheese) 4.264 2.176 0.975 -2.674 0.512 0.000 3.251 0.557 1.000 -1.399 0.763 0.034 
log(P_egg) 4.018 1.628 0.992 1.101 0.390 0.997 0.612 0.423 0.929 -0.039 0.573 0.474 
log(Sum_expd) 5.994 0.059 1.000 1.114 0.026 1.000 1.306 0.019 1.000 1.572 0.027 1.000 
Kids 9.338 1.224 1.000 1.152 0.262 1.000 0.719 0.305 0.991 0.288 0.405 0.755 
Skids 7.357 0.744 1.000 0.752 0.184 1.000 0.943 0.193 1.000 1.714 0.250 1.000 
Bkids 7.084 0.722 1.000 0.939 0.149 1.000 0.390 0.198 0.977 1.277 0.248 1.000 
Hhage -0.183 0.016 0.000 -0.035 0.005 0.000 -0.015 0.004 0.000 0.038 0.006 1.000 
Emplf -3.572 0.400 0.000 -0.116 0.083 0.080 0.268 0.101 0.995 -1.016 0.138 0.000 
Summer 0.048 0.462 0.544 -0.295 0.095 0.001 0.014 0.114 0.551 -0.576 0.156 0.000 
Winter -2.800 0.478 0.000 -0.040 0.097 0.345 -0.743 0.122 0.000 0.592 0.163 1.000 
                   
Auxiliary 
Equation 
Mean Std Prob>0 Mean Std Prob>0 Mean Std Prob>0 Mean Std Prob>0 
Yo 0.071 0.001 1.000 0.050 0.006 1.000 0.148 0.005 1.000 0.058 0.003 1.000 
mean of 
log(P_milk) 0.303 0.110 1.000 -0.547 0.314 0.000 1.363 0.210 1.000 -0.443 0.096 0.000 
mean of 
log(P_other) -0.955 0.251 0.000 -1.184 0.536 0.000 0.166 0.123 0.928 -0.278 0.155 0.045 
mean of 
log(P_cheese) 0.249 0.234 0.877 1.328 0.590 1.000 1.066 0.197 1.000 -0.834 0.359 0.000 
mean of 
log(P_egg) 0.373 0.247 0.956 0.787 0.417 1.000 -1.416 0.215 0.000 0.659 0.195 1.000 
mean of 
log(Sum_expd) -0.113 0.037 0.000 0.309 0.122 1.000 -0.112 0.024 0.000 0.286 0.076 1.000 
  
 
 
 
  
3
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mean of kids 0.275 0.111 1.000 -0.297 0.151 0.048 -0.034 0.086 0.315 -0.079 0.073 0.145 
mean of skids -0.146 0.053 0.000 0.087 0.085 0.904 -0.114 0.061 0.006 -0.030 0.055 0.367 
mean of bkids -0.008 0.038 0.391 -0.060 0.048 0.147 0.109 0.071 0.828 -0.156 0.061 0.000 
mean of hhage 0.016 0.001 1.000 0.021 0.006 1.000 0.009 0.001 1.000 0.015 0.001 1.000 
mean of emplf 0.071 0.020 1.000 0.050 0.031 0.992 -0.050 0.019 0.000 0.058 0.012 1.000 
Black -0.034 0.046 0.245 -0.333 0.139 0.000 -0.317 0.101 0.000 0.356 0.068 1.000 
White 0.075 0.048 0.988 -0.051 0.052 0.191 -0.094 0.045 0.005 -0.261 0.080 0.000 
Hispanic 0.283 0.082 1.000 0.228 0.152 0.925 0.034 0.069 0.668 0.432 0.062 1.000 
Constant -0.064 0.264 0.520 -2.938 1.461 0.000 2.884 0.633 1.000 -3.401 0.479 0.000 
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Table 2.5 Bayesian Dynamic Tobit Estimation for Milk Demand by Different  
Income Groups 
 Low income   High income   
Main Equation Mean Std Prob>0 Mean Std Prob>0 
Yt-1 0.510 0.006 1.000 0.542 0.003 1.000 
log(P_milk) -15.517 3.219 0.000 -12.560 1.436 0.000 
log(P_other) 10.650 4.894 0.985 1.946 2.148 0.821 
log(P_cheese) 9.850 5.584 0.962 4.131 2.329 0.960 
log(P_egg) -0.550 4.098 0.450 4.743 1.774 0.995 
log(Sum_expd) 6.413 0.141 1.000 5.935 0.068 1.000 
Kids 7.539 2.809 0.996 9.994 1.320 1.000 
Skids 4.019 1.737 0.990 8.194 0.809 1.000 
Bkids 5.970 1.616 1.000 7.172 0.811 1.000 
Hhage -0.140 0.036 0.000 -0.194 0.019 0.000 
Emplf -0.050 1.011 0.483 -3.992 0.452 0.000 
Summer -0.053 1.112 0.489 0.072 0.496 0.559 
Winter -3.300 1.155 0.002 -2.619 0.522 0.000 
           
Auxiliary Equation Mean Std Prob>0 Mean Std Prob>0 
Yo 0.158 0.003 1.000 0.026 0.001 1.000 
mean of log(P_milk) 0.303 1.021 0.621 -0.437 0.140 0.000 
mean of log(P_other) 0.764 1.387 0.626 -1.001 0.182 0.000 
mean of 
log(P_cheese) -2.226 0.918 0.000 -1.173 0.109 0.000 
mean of log(P_egg) -0.158 0.667 0.476 1.208 0.124 1.000 
mean of 
log(Sum_expd) -0.706 0.214 0.000 -0.214 0.065 0.000 
mean of kids 0.378 0.309 0.840 0.134 0.066 0.978 
mean of skids -0.713 0.173 0.000 -0.163 0.064 0.000 
mean of bkids 1.442 0.361 1.000 -0.176 0.059 0.000 
mean of hhage 0.009 0.004 1.000 0.011 0.001 1.000 
mean of emplf 0.158 0.099 1.000 -0.042 0.025 0.073 
Black -0.894 0.245 0.000 0.535 0.202 1.000 
White -0.747 0.136 0.000 0.253 0.160 0.884 
Hispanic 3.020 0.414 1.000 0.061 0.048 0.960 
Constant 1.312 1.401 0.830 -1.839 0.412 0.000 
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Table 2.6 Elasticities of Dairy Product Demand 
  Milk  Cheese Other Dairy  Eggs 
P_milk -0.141 -0.089 -0.127 -0.014 
  (-0.169, -0.112) (-0.148, -0.028) (-0.179, -0.075) (-0.070, 0.041) 
P_cheese 0.047 -0.287 0.259 -0.088 
  (0.000, 0.094) (-0.393, -0.179) (0.173, 0.345) (-0183, -0.07) 
P_other 0.039 -0.049 -0.129 0.011 
  (-0.003, 0.081) (-0.136, -0.036) (-0.206, -0.050) (-0.071, 0.096) 
P_egg 0.044 0.118 0.049 -0.002 
  (0.009, 0.079) (0.037, 0.202) (-0.017, 0.115) (-0.070, 0.069) 
Sum_expd 0.066 0.120 0.104 0.099 
  (0.065, 0.067) (0.115, 0.125) (0.101, 0.107) (0.096, 0.102) 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.7 Elasticities of Milk Demand by Different Income Groups 
 
 
  Low income High income 
P_milk -0.172 -0.138 
  (-0.242, -0.102) (-0.168, -0.106) 
P_cheese 0.109 0.045 
  (-0.012, 0.231) (-0.005, 0.095) 
P_other 0.118 0.021 
  (0.012, 0.222) (-0.024, 0.067) 
P_egg -0.006 0.054 
  (-0.095, 0.008) (0.014, 0.09) 
Sum_expd 0.071 0.065 
  (0.068, 0.074) (0.063, 0.066) 
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CHAPTER 3. IMPACT OF WIC PROGRAM PARTICIPATION ON FOOD 
EXPENDITURES
11
 
 
1. Introduction 
 The Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children 
(WIC) is one of the largest food assistance programs in the United States. WIC is a federally 
sponsored program administered by the Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) of United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) and implemented by 90 WIC State Agencies and 34 
Indian Tribal Organizations (USDA, 2012). The program provides benefits in the form of 
healthy foods (WIC package food), nutrition counseling, and access to health services to 
qualifying low-income infants, children up to age five, pregnant, breastfeeding, and 
postpartum women in order to improve the health of those at nutritional risk. The program 
aims to serve the targeted individuals (women, infants and young children) by providing 
supplemental foods and additional nutrition education. To participate in the program, 
applicants need to meet the eligibility criteria of having low income, being in an at-risk 
subgroup (such as pregnant, postpartum, breastfeeding women, infants and children up to age 
five) and being at nutritional risk. The food package benefits are prescribed based on the age 
and status of the qualifying individual. The benefits include foods such as infant formula, 
infant cereal, juice, iron-fortified cereal, milk, eggs, and cheese – with the specific food 
package assigned by each local agency to be consistent with federal requirements and 
consistent with the eligibility of WIC participant. In October 2009, the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture revised the WIC food package. The revised package included the introduction of 
                                                 
11
 An earlier version was prepared and presented as a Selected Poster at the Agricultural & Applied Economics 
Association’s 2014 AAEA Annual Meeting, Minneapolis, MN, July 27-29, 2014. 
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new whole-grain products, lower fat content of dairy foods, and reduced juice quantities, and 
provision of cash-value vouchers for fruits and vegetables among other changes (Federal 
Register, 2014).  
  In this paper, we seek to identify households participating in the WIC program and 
WIC-eligible households in order to evaluate the effect of WIC on the participating 
households. In the process of identifying participating and eligible households, we follow the 
work of Bitler, Currie and Scholz (2003) who analyze WIC eligibility and participation using 
different sources of information. Their paper matches the Current Population Survey (CPS) 
and the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) to an administrative data and 
compares WIC reporting patterns among respondents. Their comparisons show that WIC 
participation is significantly under-reported in both the CPS and SIPP, and more so than 
other antipoverty programs.  
 We estimate the association between WIC program participation and food 
expenditures using the Nielsen Homescan data – national level household food purchase 
data. WIC program provides participating household with free food products that may 
augment or substitute for foods that might be acquired without the program benefits. 
Although benefits are prescribed at the individual level, household level data on food 
expenditure can provide useful information for evaluating the effects of WIC program 
participation.   
 Household-level scanner data provide detailed information on each shopping trip 
made over the span of several years. This level of detail allows a more precise measurement 
of WIC impact on food consumption compared to other survey data, such as the CPS or SIPP 
that provide more coarse information on food purchases. The Homescan data provides 
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detailed information on food prices, expenditures, demographics and information on WIC 
program participation starting from 1999 allowing tracking households across a period that 
includes the change in program regulations. Detailed demographic information allows us to 
identify households that are eligible but not participating the WIC program. Although WIC 
program participation is self-reported in the HomeScan data and subject to reporting errors, 
we address this problem by carefully developing a classification of WIC eligible. A formal 
account for the possibility of misclassification error on participation status is outside the 
scope of this research. 
  Self-selection can be a problem in estimating the treatment effect in the programs 
without random assignment. A self-selection problem arises if program participants 
systematically differ from non-participants for reasons other than program participating 
status per se. For example, eligible households that prefer healthier foods may be more 
interested in participating in the WIC program in order to obtain the foods they like for free. 
Thus, unobserved factors such as attitudes towards health and food and expected future food 
security may affect the decision of participation in the WIC program and food consumption. 
In this study, we assume that the self-selection is determined by observable covariate 
variables. This can thus be done by imposing an ignorability condition.     
 Our main objective is to examine how participating in the WIC program influences 
purchase patterns of households relative to non-participating but eligible households.
12
 We 
assume that the WIC participants and their children are the primary beneficiaries of the WIC 
program and the change in the availability of foods in the household from WIC participation 
is a reasonable proxy for a change in the consumption of WIC participants. After detecting 
                                                 
12
 As observed purchases, the effect could be through vouchers and also nutrition education. We do not account 
for the nutrition education effect. 
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and removing the overreporting of WIC participation, we estimate how participating in the 
WIC program affects food expenditures and the purchases of grain food products among 
WIC participants and WIC eligible non-participants using 2008-10 data from the Nielsen 
HomeScan. In addition, we account for WIC food package change implemented in the 
middle of the period. Although WIC state agencies were required to implement new program 
rules by October 2009, some states implemented the revised packages earlier (see listing in 
Appendix 3.1). We estimate WIC impacts before/after the WIC package changes and control 
potential impact of the policy change based on the implementation dates for each state. In our 
analysis, we focus on the purchases of grain products – whole grain. Whole grain products 
were included in the 2009 WIC package revision because whole grain products are under-
consumed in the target population relative to the Dietary Guidelines for Americans (DGAs). 
We selected whole grain foods in the WIC food package as these foods are prominent in the 
WIC food package and grain products are purchased by most households. Under the new 
program rules, whole grain products were added to the food packages for women and the 
young children. At least half of the total number of breakfast cereals state agency food list 
must be whole grain. Whole-grain bread also added to the new food packages, with 
substitutions of other whole grain products allowed.
13
 We categorize the whole grain 
products into four groups of products – breads, tortillas, ready-to-eat cereals, and brown rice.         
 Because the WIC program aims to encourage healthy eating among program 
participants, analysis of consumption patterns of WIC participating households relative to 
similar non-participants allows us to see whether participation in the program is associated 
with healthy food purchases. In particular, this study provides a unique contribution to 
                                                 
13
 Possible options allowed as substitutes for whole-wheat bread are whole-grain bread, brown rice, bulgur, 
oatmeal, soft corn, barley, soft corn or whole-wheat tortillas.  
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literature on the WIC program by investigating the whole grain consumption of WIC 
participants both before and after the change of the WIC food package. Whole grain products 
had not been identified explicitly in the WIC package prior to the 2009 package revisions. To 
date, there has been relatively little research on the effect of the WIC program on whole grain 
consumption of program participants. As this study deals with evaluation of the WIC 
program in terms of purchases on WIC-approved packaged foods, it is an important 
component of program evaluation research and has implications for public health policy. 
This study provides a model for analysis of the food component changes introduced in 2009. 
In addition to that, as far as the authors are aware, this paper is the first study using national 
level scanner data to see WIC program effects on food expenditures. We take advantage of 
using scanner data which enables us to access detailed information on the food expenditure 
of households of both WIC participating and non-WIC but eligible households. Other sources 
of data often lack information on WIC status or of consistent expenditures on food. The 
research also contributes to better understanding of the potential use of scanner data for 
examining the reliability of reported WIC participation on food demand.   
 
2. Background 
 Existing literature on the WIC program finds that participation in WIC has a 
significant positive impact on the health status of the target population and a significant 
contribution to reducing food insecurity (Edmunds et al., 2014; Colman et al., 2012; 
Metallinos-Katsaras et al., 2010; Lee at al., 2006; Meyers et al., 2004; Herman et al., 2004; 
Carlson and Senauer, 2003). Research also supports positive association between WIC 
participation and infants’ growth and health (Edmunds et al., 2014; Meyers et al., 2004). 
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Other studies show WIC participation of children to have a significant positive impact on the 
overall health of children and reduce the risk of several nutrition-related health problems, 
such as anemia and nutritional deficiency (Carlson and Senauer, 2003; Lee at al., 2006). The 
literature examining WIC participation’s association with food security also finds a 
beneficial impact of WIC participation on household food security status among first-time 
program and (Metallinos-Katsaras et al., 2010; Herman et al., 2004)  
 The main mechanism for improving health outcomes for WIC program participants is 
through the free provision of healthful foods and therefore investigating the effect of WIC 
program participation on selection of specific foods is an important program outcome of 
interest. As the WIC program aims to improve healthy eating behaviors of target people, the 
analysis of consumption patterns of WIC participants allows us to see whether the program is 
associated with healthier food purchases. This is one way to measure the effectiveness of the 
program. There are relatively few studies about the effect of WIC on food consumption; most 
studies have considered the impacts of WIC on health status and dietary conditions of the 
target population. These studies have found evidence of a positive association between WIC 
participation and consumption for some WIC package foods and other related foods (Deming 
et al., 2014; Watowicz and Taylor, 2014; Oliveira and Chandran, 2005; Ponza, et al., 2004). 
Ponza et al.(2004) examine the nutrient intakes and feeding patterns of participating infants 
and toddlers and conclude that WIC participants under 24 month old were more likely than 
nonparticipants to consume many of the foods that are provided in the WIC food package 
such as cow’s milk, 100% juice and peanut butter.  
 The consumption patterns of WIC food packages for participating children under 5 
year old compared with nonparticipants have been investigated and similar positive results 
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are observed prior to the package change in 2009 (Deming et al., 2014; Watowicz and 
Taylor, 2014; Oliveira and Chandran, 2005). Most of the studies concentrated on the question 
whether WIC participation is associated with the development of more healthful eating 
patterns, in particular, increased  fruits and vegetables consumption and limiting intake of 
sugar-sweetened beverages (Deming et al., 2014; Watowicz and Taylor, 2014; Ponza et al., 
2004). Findings from Watowicz and Taylor (2014) are based on data from the National 
Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES) 2005-2010.
14
 Two studies support the 
results  from the previous study of Ponza et al.,(2004) in which WIC participation was 
associated with higher intakes of sugar-sweetened beverages for children participating in 
WIC (Deming et al., 2014; Watowicz and Taylor, 2014). Deming et al. (2014), in their study 
of young children from the 2008 Feeding Infants and Toddlers Study (FITS) also find that 
fewer WIC toddlers and preschoolers consumed any fruit compared to nonparticipants and 
fewer infants of age 6 month-12 months old consumed any vegetables compared to 
nonparticipants.  
 In order to address the shortfalls in intake and to improve overall consumption of 
foods recommended by current Dietary Guidelines, USDA introduced the revision of WIC 
food packages with new food categories, revised maximum purchase quantities and new food 
substitution policy options for state agencies. The revisions were approved and implemented 
by most of states in October 2009 (Institute of Medicine, 2005; Andreyeva et al., 2011). 
Major changes included in the package revision were placing limitations on the amounts of 
caloric sweeteners allowed, reducing saturated fat, cholesterol and total fat, promoting the 
                                                 
14
 NHANES data has only two day dietary recall to measure the food consumption, which can be very noisy, 
whereas in Homescan data we observe the food purchased for each shopping trip over the years. 
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consumption of fruits and vegetables through cash-value vouchers and introducing whole 
grain products in the breads and cereal food group. . There are many on-going studies of the 
WIC package revisions and assessing the potential effects of the new WIC package revisions 
on food selection is the main focus of this paper (See, for example, Hillier et al., 2012; 
Andreyeva and Luedicke, 2014; Bertmann et al., 2014; Thornton et al., 2014; Ritchie et al., 
2014). 
 Along with the primary intent of improving the nutrition of targeted individuals, WIC 
participation may also affect the food consumption patterns of unintended individuals within 
the WIC household (Ishdorj, Jensen and Tobias, 2008; Arcia, Crouch and Kulka, 1990). The 
program food packages are “prescribed” to qualifying individual women, infants and young 
children. Since the benefits of WIC participation are aimed at specific groups of women and 
children, not a household, “leakage” of program benefits would occur if benefits go instead 
to others in the household and reduced for the intended individual. Related literature has 
found little evidence of possible “spillover” benefits on the household members who are not 
WIC participants (Ishdorj, Jensen and Tobias, 2008; Arcia, Crouch and Richard, 1990).  
 
3. Empirical methodology 
Defining problem: treatment effect 
 Our approach to WIC program evaluation adopts the counterfactual (or potential 
outcomes) framework by Rubin (Rubin, 1974) to measure the effect of the treatment. The 
treatment variable,  refers to whether household  participates in the WIC program 
or not. Let  and  be the outcomes with treatment and without treatment, i.e., food 
expenditures of WIC participating and non-participating households. The observed outcome 
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for household  is given by . The impact of a treatment for a 
household  is defined as the difference between the potential outcome with and without 
treatment, , that is, the difference between an observed outcome and a 
counterfactual which we do not observe.  
 The main measure of interest for the treatment effect suggested in Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1983) is known as Average Treatment Effect (ATE): 
 1 0[ ]i iATE E y y  , 
which measures the mean difference across all the households including both treatment and 
control group. The average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) is another measure of 
interest: 
   1 0 1 0[ 1] [ 1] [ 1]i i i i i i iATET E y y w E y w E y w          
which is obtained by averaging the impact of the treatment on those program participating 
households. Our objective is to identify the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET). 
Instead of requiring that all control units have a positive probability of treatment, we only 
need to keep propensity scores of the treated units to be less than 1 and to have at least some 
control units with positive propensity scores. We estimate ATET under relatively weaker 
conditions than the average treatment effect.  
Propensity score: program participation model  
 The fundamental problem of estimating causal effect is that it is impossible to observe 
the counterfactual when participants have not participated. Estimating the valid 
counterfactual outcome in a relevant comparison group might be one possible way to solve 
the problem. To this end, we need to make sure that the comparison group has statistically 
identical characteristics to the treatment group in order to be the counterfactual of the 
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treatment group. This process is referred to as “matching”. In a general, non-experimental 
setting, treatment without being randomized might result in self-selection bias. The basic idea 
of matching is to reduce the possible sources of self-selection bias by controlling for the set 
of observed covariates in order to have a group that is comparable to the treated group. In 
other words, the circumstances where the matching is most likely to work are restricted in 
selection on observables into the program. 
 Propensity score matching imputes counterfactual outcomes for program participants 
using the non-treated group with similar propensity scores. The propensity score (Rosenbaum 
and Rubin, 1983) is deﬁned as the conditional probability of receiving the treatment. In order 
to implement the matching estimator, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) proposed two 
assumptions that underlie propensity score matching.
15
 First, the potential outcomes are 
statistically identical after controlling a set of observable covariates. This assumption is 
known as conditional independence or unconfoundedness or the ignorability assumption. 
This assumption essentially restates the main requirement of selection on observables 
addressed above: 
   1 0,Y Y W X .  
Second, there is a positive probability of both being participants and not being participants 
for each value of X. That is, there is a common support to ensure a similar chance of being 
treated for proper matches with a sufficient overlap in the characteristics:  
  0 Pr(W 1 ) 1X   .   
                                                 
15
 Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) note that the assignment of treatment is said to be strongly ignorable if there 
are two conditions satisfied.  
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The assumption of common support is testable by checking the distribution of estimated 
propensity scores for both the treatment group and the comparison group. 
 Based on the two main assumptions for adequate matching, we first conduct an 
estimation of the program participation model to characterize the propensity score using a 
Logit choice model (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). The propensity score of program 
participation is estimated using various household characteristics such as household income, 
size, age, the presence of kids under 5, ethnicity and regional information and indicators of 
employment and the education level of household heads.  
Matching procedure 
After we characterize the expected probability of program participation, the 
propensity score, the next step is to determine the matching estimator which will combine a 
treated group with a non-treated group with equal propensity score to estimate the 
counterfactual outcome. Note that the sample ATET we aim to estimate is given by: 
1
1
ˆ[ (x )]
ˆ ˆ[1 (x )]
N
i i i
psm
i i
w p y
ATET N
p





 , 
where 1ˆ /N N   denotes the fraction of treated units in the sample and ˆ (x )ip denotes the 
estimated probabilities of treatment.  
There are several approaches to find good matches. The choice of the matching 
procedure is important in terms of the size of samples (Heckman, et al., 1997). In this paper, 
we employ three different matching algorithms to our analysis based on the estimated 
propensity scores: nearest neighbor matching (NNM), kernel matching and Radius matching. 
NNM is one of the most straightforward matching estimators. It is conducted by simply 
comparing every treatment unit with one or more units of the non-treated group in terms of 
the closest propensity score. By imposing a tolerance level on the maximum propensity score 
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difference –or caliper – an analyst can improve NNM to have better matches. Radius 
matching is a variation of caliper matching, which specifies a caliper and chooses not only 
the nearest neighbor but all units whose differences lie within the caliper’s radius. While 
NNM uses only a few units from the non-participation group, the Kernel matching estimator 
uses weighted averages of all units in the non-treated group to construct the counterfactual 
outcome of the treatment group in a non-parametric way. One might see a trade-off going on 
between two different matching algorithms in the sense that KM achieves more efficiency 
having the lower variance with more information but it also is at risk of possible poor 
matching for some units. In contrast, while NNM reduces bias by selecting only the nearest 
neighbors which characteristics are very similar, in general, to the treated it has higher 
variance with less information ignoring many untreated units for the estimation.  
We also performed the inverse-probability weighted regression adjustment(IPWRA) 
for our analytic dataset as an alternative to propensity matching estimators as the sample size 
for WIC participating households are relatively small for obtaining reliable coefficients. We 
use the inverse of the predicted probabilities obtained from the propensity score regression as 
weights and run regressions on the outcome variable -the food expenditures for each group of 
the treated and the control (Hirano and Imbens, 2001). IPWRA is considered to be a robust 
estimator as it allows for potential misspecifications in the propensity model and it still 
provides a consistent estimate of the treatment effect even under misspecifications. 
 
4. Data  
 The treatment effect of WIC program participation is estimated by using the Nielsen 
HomeScan data for the period 2008 to 2010. The Homescan data are originally collected 
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from a nationally representative sample of households.  Identifying WIC participation was 
based on the self-reported WIC participation variable.  
 The Homescan data report on expenditures on food items purchased for each 
shopping trip during the reporting period. The household records all food items by the unique 
Uniform Product Code (UPC) using a scanning device. Information is collected by Nielsen 
on weekly basis. Only dollar expenditures for aggregated categories of random weight items 
are reported.
16
 For these random-weight categories, there is no information on prices and 
quantities. Despite the lack of detail for these items, because the total expenditure on is 
reported the deficiency does not affect the report on all food purchases for each shopping 
trip. In this paper, we aggregate food expenditure by month in order to limit the number of 
zeros.  
The Homescan dataset consist of three UPC-coded modules: dry grocery purchases, 
dairy products purchases, meat and frozen products, and a non-UPC random weight module. 
For 2008-2010, almost all whole grain items reported by the households have a UPC code.  
The data also contain information on purchase date, product category, UPC, size, quantity, 
multipack, use of coupon and the price paid. Socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics include WIC program participation status, household income, age, education 
and employment of household head, race and ethnicity, marital status, and presence of 
children. After narrowing down our analytic sample to WIC eligible households, we match 
the demographic information including WIC program participation with the food expenditure 
data to obtain the sample for analysis.  
 
                                                 
16
 Random weight items are the items which do not have a UPC codes, they may be sold by weight or by 
quantity. Most of the fresh fruit and vegetables are sold this way. Some breads baked in the supermarkets are 
sold as random weight, but they are relatively uncommon.  
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i. Identification of WIC participation households 
The Homescan data were initially screened to classify households as WIC-eligible 
and ineligible households on the basis of income and demographics. We found a number of 
possible misreporting errors on current WIC status (e.g., a household reporting WIC 
participation with no women and no children present). Initial analysis of the data suggested 
that 3%~21% of households reporting on WIC status may have been in error (either 
underreporting or over-reporting of WIC participation). From reported demographic 
characteristics and reported income (200% of poverty or below), we worked to distinguish 
eligible and ineligible households or as over-reporting. We eliminated potential over-
reporting errors (observed as WIC reporting by ineligible households). The underreporting 
issue is more difficult to deal with. 
We identified WIC reporting households for each year (2008, 2009 and 2010) based 
on the variable: Currently enrolled in WIC. Although the total number of households in each 
year is a bit different from each other, the patterns that emerge in the datasets are similar. 
Table 3.1 shows unweighted and weighted distributions of households reporting that they are 
currently enrolled in WIC in each year.
17
 In unweighted distribution, there were 674 
households in 2008, 372 households in 2009 and 439 households in 2010 that reported 
current WIC enrollment. We observe that the percentage of the WIC reporting households in 
each year of the Homescan data was a bit under 2% of the total number of households based 
                                                 
17
 “Household universe weights are available at the county level for all demographic targets. These numbers are 
kept updated at the beginning of each year and population growth is forecasted each month to allow for 
population growth. Projection factors for the data are basically computed using these numbers. The projection 
factors reflect the sample design and each factor reflects the representation of each household in the U.S. 
population, Projection factor = universe of households / sample households. The projection factor produces 
demographic weighting as well as household population projection. The projection system also takes into 
account the correlation between household demographics and item purchases. Additional weighting is also 
included in the case of lower income households because of slight under-sampling due to the difficulty of 
recruiting households in this group. The values of the weights range from small to large and reflect the 
differential probabilities of household selection.” (Harris, 2005) 
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on weighted distributions of households.
18
 Connor et al. (2011) report that in April 2010, 
10,021,136 women, infants, and children were enrolled in the WIC program and this number 
represents an increase of 5 percent over WIC enrollment reported in 2008. As the 
supplemental data set by state agencies in Connor et al. (2011) includes the number of 
household members receiving WIC benefits by each state, the weighted average number of 
people in the participant’s household was calculated as 2.35 based on the projection weights 
in 2010 Homescan data. By using this average number of household’s members we can 
convert the number of WIC households in Table 3.1 to the number of total WIC participants, 
1.9 million to 4.6 million. This estimate which is still less than the half of the total WIC 
reporting individuals in Connor et al.(2011), and the results from the data analysis in Table 
3.1 indicate that the households’ report of WIC participation is likely to be under-reported 
(Bitler, Currie and Scholz: 2003). Under-reporting in WIC can be partially explained by the 
finding in Bitler, Currie and Scholz (2003) that male respondents are less likely to report 
WIC participation in the household than female respondents other things being equal.  
The general WIC eligibility criteria include income, categorical and nutrition risk 
requirements. Individuals in households with income 185% of poverty income meet the 
income requirements. Infants, children up to age five, pregnant, breastfeeding, and 
postpartum women are categorically eligible for WIC and they should be considered to be in 
low income households and at nutritional risk. In the data we cannot observe pregnancy, 
lactation, and nutritional risk status. Individuals may be automatically eligible if they are 
                                                 
18
 In separate analysis we find that nearly 10% of all households in the NHANES data report receiving WIC 
benefits in the last 12 months (9.06% in 2007-08 and 2009-10 based on weighted data from the NHANES) and  
while 2.8% ~ 3.2% of all individuals including children and women report “currently receiving benefits” in the 
WIC program. Based on the NHANES weights, 3.2% of current WIC participants in 2009-2010 NHANES data 
reflect nearly 9.6 million number of people which is close to 10,021,136, the number of WIC participants in 
2010 (Connor et al., 2011).   
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eligible to receive SNAP benefits, Medicaid, or benefits from the  Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families (TANF, formerly known as AFDC, Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children) program. Because eligibility for these programs is often higher than 185% poverty 
income, individual may qualify for WIC even though their income is above the 185% level. 
Therefore, we identify households that are potentially eligible for WIC by including 
households that have members in a WIC qualifying age group, and have income less than and 
equal to 200% poverty income ratio. To this end, we examined whether those households 
reporting WIC do, in fact, meet the eligibility requirements of WIC based on having an 
eligible household member and having low income level (200% poverty income).  
We establish three measurements to use in identifying WIC eligible households: (a) 
low income level, (b) children under 5 years-old, and (c) having a woman of childbearing 
age. We estimate poverty income (PIR) as a ratio of the income received (using the mid-point 
of the income category) to the poverty income level for that size household, multiplied by 
100. Low income households are defined as having income less than 200% of the poverty 
level. All individuals in the household are reported by age, including children. In order to 
identify the WIC reporting households that include pregnant, breastfeeding or postpartum 
women, we screen for households that report any female age 14-44 years old (the age range 
used in the IOM WIC report).  Based on the three measurements described above, the 
screening for WIC eligible households was applied to those low income households with 
children under 5 years-old and those low income households with a woman of child bearing 
age.  Thus, all eligible households need to be “poor” and have either children under 5 years-
old or woman of child bearing age.  
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In Table 3.2, we check the number of households that are determined to be “eligible” 
against those reporting WIC enrollment during each year. We would expect the number to be 
the same as the total WIC reporting households if all eligible households also reported 
participation. However, as we see in the unweighted distribution of the reported data, in 2008 
only 398 of the 654 total households reporting WIC enrollment (61% of the WIC 
households), satisfy the loosened eligibility criteria and 57% - a slightly smaller percentage – 
of the households in 2009 were determined WIC eligible. In 2010, there are 287 households 
identified as “eligible”, or 65% of the WIC participating households.   Table 3.2 also shows 
more detail on the households that reported WIC but are likely ineligible.  We observe 35% - 
43% of WIC reporting households do not satisfy the eligibility requirements (based on 
income and demographics) for each year. Most households that we consider erroneously 
reported WIC status were disqualified on the basis of high income levels. It is possible that 
some of these households will not qualify during the next program recertification, or may in 
fact qualify based on participation in another program (e.g., Medicaid).  
After removing the 35-43% of WIC-participating but not eligible households, we use 
the remaining households that satisfy WIC eligibility criteria in the subsequent analysis. 
Table3.3 represents the distribution of WIC participation among eligible households in each 
year. For panel analysis, we are interested in looking at the households that are in three 
consecutive years. Of all the households that remained in the sample during the three years 
(39,834), almost half of the total sample of eligible households in each year, stayed in the 
data system.  The second part of Table 3.3 shows the distribution of WIC reporting and 
eligible households among households with any purchases over three years. Once we apply 
the additional filter of reporting three consecutive years of WIC participation, the number of 
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WIC reporting and eligible households in each year gets smaller. For example, only 223 
households of 398 households that reported on WIC participation and were eligible in 2008 
also were in the data system during the three years. Some of these 223 households 
participated in WIC in 2009 or in 2010 while some portion would have dropped out of the 
program during the next two years. Likewise, eligibility status may also vary over the three 
years.  
Appendix 3.2 shows a more detailed distribution of WIC status and eligibility status 
in 2008, 2009 and 2010. As shown in Appendix 3.2, we are able to check how many 
households changed their WIC participation status and eligibility status during the years. For 
example, 119 households of the 223 WIC reporting households in 2008 were not on WIC for 
the next two years and 31 households returned to the program in 2010 while 73 households 
continued on the program in 2009; 38 households of those 73 households retained WIC status 
in 2010. For the analysis, we define treatment in the model to be participation in the WIC 
program at least once during three consecutive years for simplicity; the control is defined as 
households that were never on WIC but eligible at least one year during the 3 years.   
ii. Identification of WIC related food expenditures 
 Our tentative target food of interest is “grain” foods, a group of foods that are widely 
prescribed in the WIC foods package. There are four categories of grain products in the WIC 
packages: bread, ready-to-eat cereal, rice and tortillas. The Final Rule defines whole grain 
products as: whole grain or whole wheat bread must conform to FDA standard of identity (21 
CFR 136.110), must be the primary ingredient by weight in all whole grain bread products 
and must meet FDA labeling requirements for making a health claim as a “whole grain food 
with moderate fat content”. Among the new WIC package requirements were to require that 
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at least one half of breakfast cereals be identified as whole grain and that whole-grain bread 
was introduced with allowable substitutions of other whole grains (rice, tortillas) allowed. 
  In this paper, we constructed a dataset of grain products that consist of four categories 
as in the WIC packages: bread, read-to-eat cereal, rice and tortillas. We do not consider buns, 
rolls, bagels, or muffins as bread but only take bakery bread type; rice includes packaged and 
bulk, canned, mixes and instant forms. In order to focus on the expenditures of grain products 
allowed in WIC packages, we exclude any other grain products that are not relevant to the 
WIC program, such as snack, bread mixes, canned bread, granola or hot cereals etc. For the 
treatment effect analysis, we identify whole grain products by separating grain products into 
two parts, refined grain products and whole grain products based on UPC description, grain 
type and product category (product module) variables in the scanner data. 
 For our analysis of data from 2008 to 2010, we restricted our final analytic sample to 
3,198 WIC eligible households that reported grain expenditures in all three years as shown in 
Table 3.4. There are 3,198 households with grain expenditure in three consecutive years that 
are eligible some time during the years and 312 households report WIC at least once during 
three years. Similar to previous analysis in Appendix 3.1, we can indicate WIC identification 
and eligibility status for those with three years of grain purchases in Appendix 3.3. By 
comparing Appendix 3.3 with the previous table of distributions (Appendix 3.2), we note that 
all of households who were on the WIC program at least a year over the three year period 
purchased some grain products during the time period while very few of households never on 
the WIC program did not purchase grain product.   
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5. Results 
Based on our analytic dataset from the previous section, we estimate the treatment 
effect of the WIC program on grain product expenditure through the propensity score 
matching procedure. Note that as our treatment group is eligible WIC participating 
households, the comparison group is restricted to eligible households not participating in 
WIC. To clarify the terms we use from now on in the estimation, ‘eligible’ means ‘eligible at 
least a year during three consecutive years’ and ‘participating’ refers to ‘participating in the 
program at least a year during the time period’. In the estimation of the propensity score, the 
set of covariates includes household income, size, maximum age of the household's heads, 
the presence of kids under 5, and indicators of employment and education level of household 
heads, race/ethnicity, and regional location. The description of variables and summary 
statistics are shown in Table 3.5.
19
 Several WIC participation indicators including WIC 
participation at least once during three years and participation in each year are also given. We 
would expect that household income and the presence of kids under 5 might be correlated 
with participation in the WIC program and food expenditure as those variables are not 
perfectly controlled from the analytic steps for our final sample. We would expect that the 
household size and the employment status of either household head (male, female) might 
affect the decision to participate in the program. Note that it is still possible to have an 
income higher than the maximum income for eligibility in one of the years and still be in the 
final sample. For example, a household might have been eligible in the first two years (2008, 
2009) and not be eligible in 2010 because of earning high income in 2010. We include this 
                                                 
19
 We calculated summary statistics with the weighted distributions of households in the scanner data.   
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household in our analytic sample according to our definition of eligibility in the estimation 
because the household was eligible at least one year during the three years.    
  Summary statistics for purchases on grain products are reported in Table 3.6. We 
calculate monthly average of whole and refined grain expenditures and weights over the 3 
years of pooled data, before and after the implementation of the WIC package change. 
Although October 2009 was the date approved for implementing the package changes, some 
states implemented the new rules earlier (see Appendix 3.1). We matched the information on 
implementation dates to each household’s location to calculate monthly average expenditures 
and weights before and after the change in policy. Table 3.6 shows that both whole grain and 
refined grain expenditures and weights of WIC participating households are greater than 
those of non-WIC households across the 3 years, before the change and after the change. In 
addition, whole grain expenditures and weights of WIC households increased after the 
package change and this fact suggests that there may be a potential impact of the WIC 
change in boosting expenditures and weights by WIC participating households relative to 
non-participating households. In order to have better understanding of the changes, we 
conduct a difference-in-difference analysis to estimate the WIC impact excluding the 
possible influence of the policy change in the estimation.  
 The propensity score is estimated through a logit participation model. We are 
interested in the decision to participate in WIC for at least one year during the three years. 
Table 3.7 presents the results of the estimation of the probability of the household’s 
participation in the WIC program at least once in the 3 years. The results with significant 
levels show that household size and the presence of kids under 5 are highly correlated with 
WIC participation in the model and that the employment of a household’s female head is 
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negatively correlated with WIC program participation. The households with relatively older 
male or female head are less likely to participate in the program. We also observe some 
locational effects on the participation: households in west or south in the United States are 
less likely to join the program.    
 In order to have a relevant estimator for program evaluation, one might be interested 
in testing if there is a proper imposition of the common support condition in the estimation of 
propensity scores through the distribution of propensity scores for each group. For the 
assumption to hold true there must be an overlap of the propensity scores of the treatment 
group and control group. In Figure 1, as an example we report the distribution of predicted 
propensity scores of both treatment and comparison groups in our main model evaluated 
under the case of at least one-year participation. Most of propensity scores in both treatment 
and comparison groups fall into the range of [0, 0.79]. Thus, it is not unreasonable to impose 
an assumption of common support to ensure that there are sufficient overlaps of the 
probability of the program participation in the characteristics. It satisfies the first requirement 
of using matching for estimating the treatment effect of WIC program participation.  
 We matched WIC treated and untreated observations based on the estimated 
propensity score. In order to check if the matching improved the balance of the covariates 
among two groups, we conduct balancing tests comparing the mean of each covariate before 
(unmatched) and after matching (matched) and report the results of the main model in Table 
3.8. The average values of each covariate, the percentage difference in means (percentage 
bias) and p-values for t-statistics of the mean differences are reported. Table 3.8 shows that 
most of variables have more balanced values after the matching as the percentage bias of 
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each covariate were reduced except for few variables such as male and female education.
20
 
The reduction of overall bias through the matching can be seen from the difference in mean 
bias between two samples in unmatched and matched. With two different tests above, we can 
conclude the propensity score matching process is relevant and successful for our study on 
WIC participation. 
 Table 3.9 represents the matching results of average treatment effect on treated 
(ATET) using estimated propensity scores for the WIC participation indicator. We also 
report the results of inverse-probability weighted regression adjustment (IPWRA) as an 
alternative to propensity matching estimators. We estimate at least one year of WIC 
participation on whole grain product purchases. We are interested in looking at how the 
experience of WIC participation during the three consecutive years affected whole grain 
consumption over the three years.  
 As the new WIC package was implemented during 2009, one might also be interested 
in seeing the treatment effects before and after the introduction of the package change.
21
 In 
addition to that, merely examining treatment effects without the impact of WIC package 
changes as a positive demand shock is useful. Therefore, we have four outcome measures in 
the analysis between the treatment (WIC program participation) and control: (1) the 
difference in monthly average expenditure of whole grain products in 2008-2010, (2) the 
difference in average whole grain expenditure before package change, (3) the difference in 
average whole grain expenditure after package change and (4) the difference in difference in 
                                                 
20
 Table 3.8 and Figure 3.1 are based on the estimation of NNM(n=10) as the method  gives us smaller bias and 
no off support observation.  
21
 We created a variable that indicates whether each transaction of purchasing grain products occurred before or 
after the particular date of the policy implementation. All WIC agencies should have changed the package by 
October 2009. In appendix 3, there is information of implementation dates for WIC food packages by state 
agencies.  
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average whole grain expenditure over WIC package changes. We compare the results of 
different matching methods such as Nearest neighbor matching, Kernel matching and Radius 
matching to check the robustness of the estimation results of average treatment effects. We 
use 10 neighbors in the non-participating households to match each participating households 
comparing with one-to-one matching. We use 0.06 bandwidth for Kernel estimator and 0.05 
radius for Radius estimator which fit well with the data.      
 In Table 3.9, the significant differences of monthly average whole grain expenditures 
during three years between treatment and control group are shown over all four matching 
mechanisms. Results on households with at least one-year WIC participation (Outcome A) 
indicate that WIC participating households purchased more whole grain products over the 
three years, on average. One interesting observation is that the differences of expenditures 
made after the WIC package changes are generally higher than the differences over the 
periods that include times before the changes (Outcomes C and B). The treatment effect of 
WIC participation on whole grain expenditures after the policy change seems to be stronger 
than the effects over all three years. However, there should be positive impact of WIC 
package changes promoting whole grain consumption so we need to control the impact of the 
change on whole grain expenditures.  
For the last outcome measure (Outcome D), we first took differences between 
average expenditures before and after the policy changes for each group and compared these 
differences by different groups. Applying difference-in-difference to propensity score 
matching estimation reduces the treatment effect by decreasing the size of estimates from the 
first outcome to the fourth outcome. From this observation, it might be possible to show 
indirectly the potential impact of the implementation of the WIC package change as being 
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positive shock for whole grain purchases. Most of matching procedures except one-to-one 
NNM give us the consistent result that there is no significant treatment effect of WIC 
participation on whole grain expenditures after we control for the positive effect of the policy 
change on demand. We can interpret the results presented here as showing a significant and 
positive effect of the WIC package revision on increasing whole grain expenditures.   
The estimation results under our main specification are based on the loosened 
eligibility criteria including all potentially eligible households that have either children under 
5 years-old or woman of child bearing age. However, there are many women in the age range 
14-44 years old who do not have children under 5 or are not pregnant. In order to check the 
robustness of our main findings, we discard the observations for households with women of 
child bearing age and no children under 5. By limiting to households with children under 5, 
we are likely to only miss pregnant women without other children at home. We expect this 
number to be small. We can control for pregnancy by looking at which households added 
infants in the next year’s survey; there were no additional infants reported over 2009-2010 in 
the data. Table 3.10 and 3.11 show that dropping households with no children reduced the 
number of total eligible households for each year and the number of observations ultimately 
declined to 448 from 3198.
22
  
 The estimation results with the new subsample are shown in the Table 3.12.
23
 By 
comparing the results in Table 3.9, we observe a similar order of magnitude in the estimates 
with less statistical significance over most of the methods due to a decline of statistical 
significance with the smaller sample size. There are no substantial, significant differences in 
                                                 
22
 This sample has almost 40% of eligible women on WIC, which is a better match to the national statistics. 
23
 Table 3.10, Table 3.11 and Table 3.12 with the new subsample are comparable to Table 3.3, Table 3.4, and 
Table 3.9 with the main specification.  
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the monthly average whole grain expenditures during the three years (outcome A). The 
period before the package change (outcome B) between treatment and control group are 
shown over all mechanisms. Most of matching procedures except NNM provide some 
significant effect associated with WIC participation on whole grain expenditures after the 
package change – outcome C - while there is no significant treatment effect for outcome D 
on the difference in difference estimation. Thus, we conclude that the significant effects on 
outcome C were more likely attributed to the policy change and not from the WIC 
participation itself. Estimating with two different samples allows us to show that the results 
in this paper are consistent and robust.   
 
6. Conclusion 
 This paper investigates the impact of participating in the WIC program on food 
purchasing patterns of households. Using Nielsen HomeScan data for 2008-2010, we 
compare expenditures on whole grain products of WIC participating households to those of 
non-participating but eligible households using propensity score matching methods. The 
results of the average treatment effect estimation show that the monthly average whole grain 
expenditures of households with at least one-year WIC participation are significantly higher 
than the control (eligible but not participating in WIC). The finding that WIC participating 
households purchase more whole grain products than non- participating eligible households 
is useful for evaluating the effectiveness of WIC program participation. A major objective of 
the WIC program is to increase consumption of healthy foods. Furthermore, in terms of 
whole grain expenditures, this study may address the issue of recent policy change to the 
WIC food package which included the introduction of whole grain products to the WIC 
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packages. In order to see the WIC participation effect over the package changes, we use 
difference-in-difference propensity matching estimator and this provides us the result of the 
potential impact of the food package changes, implemented as a positive policy shock. In all 
three matching methods, we observed consistently that it was the policy shock that played an 
important role relative to purchasing whole grains rather than the treatment effect of WIC 
participation itself. A possible extension of the work is to examine the influence of the WIC 
package changes on the expenditure of the other relevant food groups such as fruit and 
vegetable might in the similar analysis.  
62 
 
 
 
REFERENCES 
Andreyeva, T., J. Luedicke, A. E. Middleton, M. W. Long and M. B. Schwartz. 2011. 
“Changes in Access to Healthy Foods after Implementation of the WIC Food Package 
Revisions.” ERS Report No. 66.  
Andreyeva, T. and J. Luedicke. 2014. “Incentivizing fruit and vegetable purchases among 
participants in the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and 
Children.” Public Health Nutrition May(9): 1-9  
Arcia, G. J., L. A. Crouch and R. A. Kulka. 1990. “Impact of the WIC Program on Food 
Expenditures.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 72(1): 218-226. 
Bertmann F. M. W, C. Barroso, P. Ohri-Vachaspati, J. S. Hampl, K. Sell and C. M. Wharton. 
2014. “Women, Infants, and Children cash value voucher (CVV) use in Arizona: A 
qualitative exploration of barriers and strategies related to fruit and vegetable 
purchases.” Journal of Nutrition Education and Behavior 46(S1):S53-S58. 
Bitler, M., J. Currie and J. Scholz. 2003. “WIC Eligibility and Participation.” Journal of 
Human Resources38: 1139-1179. 
Carlson, A and B.Senauer. 2003. “The impact of the special supplemental nutrition program 
for Women, Infants, and Children on child health.” American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 85(2): 479–491. 
Colman, S., I. P. Nichols-Barrer, J. E. Redline, B. L. Devaney, S. V. Ansell and Joyce, T. 
2012. “Effects of the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, 
and Children (WIC): A Review of Recent Research.” Special Nutrition Assistance 
Programs Report No. 7368, Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of 
Agriculture. 
63 
 
 
 
Connor, P., S. Bartlett, M. Mendelson, K. Lawrence, K. Wen, et al. 2011. “WIC Participant 
and Program Characteristics 2010.” Special Nutrition Programs Report No. WIC-10-
PC, Food and Nutrition Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
Dehejia, R. H. and S. Wahba. 1999. “Causal Effects in Non-Experimental Studies: 
Reevaluating the Evaluation of Training Programs.” Journal of the American 
Statistical Association 94(448): 1053-1062. 
Deming D.M., R. R. Briefel and K. C. Reidy 2014. “Infant feeding practices and food 
consumption patterns of children participating in WIC.” Journal of Nutrition 
Education and Behavior, 46(S3):S29-S37.  
Edmunds, L. S., J. P. Sekhobo, B. A. Dennison, M. A. Chiasson, H. H. Stratton and K. K. 
Davison. 2014. “Association of Prenatal Participation in a Public Health Nutrition 
Program with Healthy Infant Weight Gain.” American Journal of Public Health 
104(S1) 
Herman, D. R., G. G. Harrison, A.A. Afifi and E. Jenks. 2004. “The Effect of the WIC 
Program on Food Security Status of Pregnant, First-Time Participants.” Family 
Economics and Nutrition Review 16(1) 
Harris, J. M. 2005. “Using Nielsen Homescan Data and Complex Survey Design Techniques 
To Analyze Convenience Food Expenditures.” Selected Paper prepared for 
presentation at the American Agricultural Economics association Annual Meeting, 
Providence, Rhode Island, July 24-27, 2005. 
Hillier, A., J. McLaughlin, C.C. Cannuscio, M. Chilton, S. Krasny and A. Karpyn. 2012. 
“The Impact of WIC Food Package Changes on Access to Healthful Food in 2 Low-
64 
 
 
 
Income Urban Neighborhoods.” Journal of Nutrition Education and Behavior 
44(3):210-216. 
Hirano, K and Imbens, G W. 2001. “Estimation of Causal Effects Using Propensity Score 
Weighting: An Application to Data on Right Heart Catheterization.” Health Services 
and Outcomes Research Methodology 2(3-4): 259–78.   
Institute Of Medicine. 2005. “WIC food packages: Time for a change.” The national 
academies press. 
Ishdorj, A., H. H. Jensen, and J. Tobias. 2008. “Intra-household Allocation and Consumption 
of WIC Approved Foods: A Bayesian Approach.” Advances in Econometrics, 23:157-
182. 
Lee, B., L. Mackey-Bilaver, and M. Chin. 2006. “Effects of WIC and Food Stamp Program 
Participation on Child Outcomes.” Contractor and Cooperator Report No. 27, 
Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
Metallinos-Katsaras, E., K. S. Gorman, P. Wilde and J. Kallio. 2011. “A Longitudinal Study 
of WIC Participation on Household Food Insecurity.” Maternal and Child Health 
Journal 15(5): 627-633. 
Meyers, A. F., T. Herren, S. Levenson, P. H. Casey, C. Berkowitz, N. Zaldivar, J. T. Cook, 
M. M. Black, D. B. Cutts, D. A. Frank, J. Geppert and A. Skalicky. 2004. 
“Participation and Infants' Growth and Health: A Multisite Surveillance Study.” 
Pediatrics 114(1). 
Oliveira, V. and R. Chandran. 2005. “Children’s Consumption of WIC-Approved Foods.” 
Food Assistance and Nutrition Research Report No. 44, Economic Research Service, 
U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
65 
 
 
 
Ponza, M., B. ,P. Z. Devaney,  K. Reidy and C. Squatrito. 2004. “Nutrient Intakes and Food 
Choices of Infants and Toddlers Participating in WIC.” Journal of the American 
Dietetic Association, 104(1): S71-S79.  
Ritchie, L. D., S. E. Whaley and N. J. Crocker. 2014. “Satisfaction of California WIC 
participants with food package changes.” Journal of Nutrition Education and 
Behavior 46(S1):S71-S78. 
Thornton, H. E.B, S. H. Crixell, A. M. Reat and J. A. Von Bank. 2014 “Differences in energy 
and micronutrient intakes among central Texas WIC infants and toddlers after the 
package change.” Journal of Nutrition Education and Behavior 46(S1):S79-S86. 
National Archives and Records Administration. 2014 “Special Supplemental Nutrition 
Program for Women, Infants and Children (WIC): Revisions in the WIC Food 
Packages.” Final Rule. Federal Register 72(42). Available at:  
http://www.fns.usda.gov/sites/default/files/03-04-14_WIC-Food-Packages-Final-
Rule.pdf 
Watowicz, R. P. and C. A. Taylor. 2014. “Comparison of Beverage Intakes in US Children 
Based on WIC Participation and Eligibility.” Journal of Nutrition Education and 
Behavior, 46(S3):S59-S64.  
  
  
  
6
6
 
Table 3.1 The number of WC reporting households (HHs) in Homescan data 
WIC-currently 
reporting 
Scanner 2008 Scanner 2009 Scanner 2010 
Unweighted  
WIC reporting HHs 654(1.06%) 372(0.61%) 439(0.72%) 
Blank (Missing) 60786(98.94%) 60134 (99.39%) 60209 (99.28%) 
Total 61440(100%) 60506(100%) 60648 (100%) 
 
Weighted  
WIC reporting HHs 2,322,106(1.97%) 1,476,452(1.25%) 1,901,481(1.60%)  
Blank (Missing) 115,380,000(98.03%) 117,020,000(98.75%) 116,920,000(98.40%) 
Total 117,702,106 118,496,452 118,821,481 
Source: Nielsen Homescan 2008-2010  
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Table 3.2 WIC eligible and non-eligible HHs in reporting HHs  
    Scanner 2008 Scanner 2009 Scanner 2010 
WIC reporting HHs   654(100%) 372(100%) 439(100%) 
WIC eligible   398(60.86%) 212(56.99%) 287(65.38%) 
 kids and no chbr women 19(2.91%) 9(2.42%) 8(1.82%) 
  no kids and chbr women 85(13.00%) 52(13.98%) 71(16.17%) 
 kids and chbr women 294(44.95%) 151(40.59%) 208(47.38%) 
     
WIC non-eligible   256(39.14%) 160(43.01%) 152(34.62%) 
 
high income 230(35.17%) 141(37.90%) 138(31.33%) 
  no kids and no chbr women  26(3.98%) 19(5.11%) 14(3.19%) 
Source: Nielsen Homescan 2008-2010 
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Table 3.3 WIC reporting HHs in eligible HHs (pir <=200 and children or chbr women) 
  Scanner 2008 Scanner 2009 Scanner 2010 
WIC reporting and eligible HHs in each year 
WIC reporting HHs 398(8.50%) 212 (4.75%) 287 (6.49%) 
Blank (Missing) 4286(91.50%) 4377 (95.25%) 4137 (93.51%) 
Total WIC eligible HHs  4694(100%) 4459 (100%) 4424 (100%) 
 
WIC reporting and eligible HHs among 39834 HHs with any purchases of three consecutive years  
WIC reporting HHs 223(9.84%) 128 (5.79%) 123 (5.62%) 
Blank (Missing) 2039(90.16%) 2081(94.21%) 2067(94.38%) 
Total WIC eligible HHs  2266(100%) 2209(100%) 2190 (100%) 
Source: Nielsen Homescan 2008-2010 
 
Table 3.4 WIC reporting HHs in eligible HHs with grain purchases  
in three consecutive years 
  Scanner 2008-2010  
WIC reporting and eligible HHs* 312 
Non-WIC but eligible HHs 2886 
Total eligible HHs with any grain purchases 3198 
Total HHs with any grain purchases in three years 36477 
 
HHs with any grain purchases in each year 
 
in 2008  
in 2009 
60981 
60043 
In 2010 60177 
Source: Nielsen Homescan 2008-2010 
* At least one year of WIC reporting with at least one year of WIC eligible.
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Table 3.5 Definitions and Statistics on the Variables for Sampled Households
 
Variable Mean Std.Dev Minimum Maximum 
N Number of final analytic sample 
24
 3198    
HHinc Household income ($) 30220.89 17598.04 5000.00 200000.00 
HHage 
Maximum age of the two household's 
heads 
48.41 12.46 2.00 98.00 
Fhage Age of  the household’s female head25 46.15 12.60 2.00 93.00 
HHsize Household size 3.74 1.66 1.00 9.00 
 
Binary Variables (equal 1 if following conditions met, and 0 otherwise) 
WIC_id 
Household reports WIC participation at least 
once during 2008-2010 
0.140 0.347 0.000 1.000 
WIC08 Household reports WIC participation in 2009 0.094 0.291 0.000 1.000 
WIC09 Household reports WIC participation in 2009 0.060 0.238 0.000 1.000 
WIC10 Household reports WIC participation in 2010 0.066 0.247 0.000 1.000 
Kids Household has a kid under 5 year olds 0.192 0.394 0.000 1.000 
Edmscol Male household head’s education is collage 
level 
0.304 0.460 0.000 1.000 
Edfscol Female household head’s education is collage 
level 
0.329 0.470 0.000 1.000 
Emplf Female household head is employed 0.521 0.500 0.000 1.000 
Emplm Male household head is employed 0.665 0.472 0.000 1.000 
Black Household's sampled person’s race is Black 0.156 0.363 0.000 1.000 
Hispanic 
Household's sampled person’s ethnicity is 
Hispanic 
0.140 0.347 0.000 1.000 
West Region is west 0.200 0.400 0.000 1.000 
South Region is south 0.397 0.489 0.000 1.000 
Central Region is central 0.243 0.429 0.000 1.000 
Source: Nielsen Homescan 2008-2010 
                                                 
24
 The number reflects the total number of eligible households with any grain purchases in three consecutive years. 
25
 61 households do not have information of female head age. 
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Table 3.6 Summary Statistics on Monthly Average Grain Expenditures ($) and Weights (OZ) 
    
3 year 
pooled data 
Before package 
change 
After 
package 
change 
WIC  Whole Grain Exp.(N=309) 7.33 6.79 7.31 
(N=312) Refined Grain Exp.(N=312) 14.20 14.26 13.47 
 
Total Grain Exp. 21.46 21.05 20.78 
     Non WIC Whole Grain Exp.(N=2853) 6.00 5.80 5.57 
(N=2886) Refined Grain Exp.(N=2885) 11.84 11.94 11.18 
 
Total Grain Exp. 17.76 17.74 16.75 
Diff. in Whole Grain Exp.     
Between WIC and Non-WIC HHs 1.34 0.99 1.74 
     
WIC  
Whole Grain Weight(OZ) 
(N=309) 50.93 44.98 51.05 
(N=312) 
Refined Grain Weight(OZ) 
(N=312) 126.93 130.4 116.83 
 
Total Grain Weight(OZ)  177.48 175.38 167.88 
     
Non WIC 
Whole Grain Weight(OZ) 
(N=2853) 45.86 44.03 42.57 
(N=2886) 
Refined Grain Weight(OZ) 
(N=2885) 106.95 108.9 99.94 
 
Total Grain Weight(OZ)  152.19 152.93 142.51 
Diff. in Whole Grain Weight(OZ)     
Between WIC and Non-WIC HHs 5.07 0.95 8.48 
Source: Nielsen Homescan 2008-2010 
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Table 3.7 Participation model 
 
WIC participation  
at least once over 
three years 
 
 
Coef. Std. Err. 
Inc=hhinc/1000 -0.011 0.013 
hhsize 0.375*** 0.099 
hhsize*inc -0.002 0.003 
kids 3.554*** 0.476 
inc*kids -0.015 0.010 
hsize*kids -0.195 0.096 
hhage -0.099** 0.043 
2hhage   0.001 0.000 
edmscol 0.107 0.153 
emplf -0.355** 0.142 
edfscol -0.007 0.151 
emplm -0.280 0.171 
black 0.278 0.218 
hispanic 0.299 0.255 
west -0.531** 0.246 
south -0.525** 0.202 
central 0.007 0.197 
_cons -0.105 1.131 
   Number of obs. 3198  
Log likelihood  -7895.11 
 LR chi2(17)  466.52 
 Pseudo R2  0.228 
 Source: Nielsen Homescan 2008- 2010 
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Table 3.8 Balancing test   
  Unmatched Mean %reduct t-test 
Variable Matched Treated Control %bias bias t p>t 
inc Unmatched 30.831 33.171 -14.3   -2.21 0.027 
 
Matched 30.831 31.96 -6.9 51.8 -0.94 0.346 
  
   
 
  
 
 
hhsize Unmatched 4.5288 3.5908 57.7   9.65 0.000 
 
Matched 4.5288 4.5112 1.1 98.1 0.14 0.891 
  
   
 
  
 
 
kids Unmatched .56731 .09667 115.2   24.63   0.000 
 
Matched .56731 .57724 -2.4 97.9 -0.25 0.802 
  
   
 
  
 
 
hhage Unmatched 46.25     51.19 -43.5   -7.42 0.000 
 
Matched 46.25    46.125 1.1 97.5 0.14 0.890 
  
   
 
  
 
 
edmscol Unmatched .32372 .30873 3.2   0.54 0.587 
 
Matched .32372 .34776 -5.2 -60.4 -0.63 0.526 
  
   
 
  
 
 
emplf Unmatched .41987 .54712 -25.7   -4.29 0.000 
 
Matched .41987 .45096 -6.3 75.6 -0.78 0.434 
  
   
 
  
 
 
edfscol Unmatched .33333 .33229 0.2   0.04 0.970 
 
Matched .33333 .35128 -3.8 -1626.7 -0.47 0.637 
  
   
 
  
 
 
emplm Unmatched .69872 .68919 2.1   0.35 0.730 
 
Matched .69872 .70417 -1.2 42.8 -0.15 0.882 
  
   
 
  
 
 
black Unmatched .10577 .11573 -3.2   -0.52 0.600 
 
Matched .10577 .09167 4.5 -41.6 0.59 0.556 
  
   
 
  
 
 
hispanic Unmatched .08013 .06584 5.5   0.96 0.338 
 
Matched .08013 .08686 -2.6 52.9 -0.30 0.762 
  
   
 
  
 
 
west Unmatched .13782 .15835 -5.8   -0.95 0.343 
 
Matched .13782 .13494 0.8 85.9 0.10 0.917 
  
   
 
  
 
 
south Unmatched .32372 .3815 -12.1   -2.00 0.045 
 
Matched .32372 .31699 1.4 88.4 0.18 0.857 
  
   
 
  
 
 
central Unmatched .36538 .28933 16.2   2.80 0.005 
 
Matched .36538 .3734 -1.7 89.5 -0.21 0.836 
              
Sample p>chi2 MeanBias MedBias 
 Raw 0 23.4 12.1 
  Matched 0.999 3 2.4     
Source: Nielsen Homescan 2008-2010 
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Table 3.9 Treatment effects of WIC participation on whole grain expenditures ($) 
  
Treatment: Participation during three consecutive 
years 
 
    
 
Nearest Nearest Kernel Radius IPWRA Unmatched 
 
 
Neighbor Neighbor Matching 
 
 
  
 
(N=1) (N=10) (BW=0.06) (r=0.05)  
  
     
 
  
 
Outcome A =Dif in Average Expenditure of Whole Grain in 2008-2010 (Monthly ) 
 
 
1.135** 1.100*** 1.092*** 1.066*** 0.968*** 1.333*** 
 
 
(0.3610) (0.3431) (0.3130) (0.3021) (0.2951) (0.2202) 
 
     
 
  
 
Outcome B = Dif in Average Whole Grain Expenditure before package change 
 
 
0.715 0.816 0.793 0.930*** 0.678 0.987*** 
 
 
(0.3580) (0.3457) (0.3230) (0.2753) (0.2947) (0.2331) 
 
     
 
  
 
Outcome C = Dif in Average Whole Grain Expenditure after package change 
 
 
1.578*** 1.442*** 1.450*** 1.660*** 1.268*** 1.738*** 
 
 
(0.3705) (0.3776) (0.3406) (0.2979) (0.3251) (0.2483) 
 
     
 
  
 
Outcome D = Dif in Dif in Average Whole Grain Expenditure over WIC package 
changes  
 
 
0.862** 0.626 0.657 0.703 0.589 0.751*** 
 
 
(0.3055) (0.2840) (0.2843) (0.2973) (0.2712) (0.197) 
 
     
 
  
 
Number of 
observations 
   
 
  
 
3198 3198 3198 3198 3198 3198 
 
 
Number of treated(WIC ever) used  
 
 
  
 
312 312 307 305 312 312 
 
 
Number of untreated(never WIC) used  
 
 
    231 1221 2881 2874 2886 2886   
Source: Nielsen Homescan 2008- 2010 
The standard errors in parenthesis are calculated from bootstrapping with 500 repetitions. 
*** significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, * significant  
at the 10 percent level.   
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Table 3.10 WIC reporting HHs in eligible HHs with Subsample (for Robustness check) 
  Scanner 2008 Scanner 2009 Scanner 2010 
WIC reporting and eligible HHs in each year 
WIC reporting HHs 313(27.38%) 160 (15.72%) 216 (22.27%) 
Blank (Missing) 830(72.62%) 858 (84.28%) 754 (77.73%) 
Total WIC eligible HHs  1143(100%) 1018(100%) 970(100%) 
 
WIC reporting and eligible HHs among 39834 HHs with any purchases of three consecutive 
years  
WIC reporting HHs 141(29.38%) 74(16.41%) 85(20.38%) 
Blank (Missing) 339(70.63%) 388(83.59%) 332(79.62%) 
Total WIC eligible HHs  480(100%) 451(100%) 417(100%) 
Source: Nielsen Homescan 2008- 2010 
 
Table 3.11 WIC reporting HHs in eligible HHs with grain purchases  
in three consecutive years with Subsample (for Robustness check) 
  Scanner 2008-2010  
WIC reporting and eligible HHs* 177 
Non-WIC but eligible HHs 271 
Total eligible HHs with any grain purchases 448 
Total HHs with any grain purchases in three 
years 
36477 
HHs with any grain purchases in each year 
 
in 2008  60981 
in 2009 60043 
In 2010 60177 
Source: Nielsen Homescan 2008- 2010 
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Table 3.12 Treatment effects of WIC participation on whole grain expenditures ($)  
in Subsample (for Robustness check) 
  Treatment: Participation during three consecutive years 
 
Nearest Nearest Kernel Radius IPWRA Unmatched 
 
Neighbor Neighbor Matching 
 
 
  
 
(N=1) (N=10) (BW=0.06) (r=0.05) 
 
  
     
 
  
 
Outcome A =Dif in Average Expenditure of Whole Grain in 2008-2010 
(Monthly) 
 
 
0.933 0.984 1.105 1.124* 1.118* 1.313*** 
 
 
-0.4695 -0.5801 -0.4369 -0.4211 -0.4103 -0.3801 
 
     
 
  
 
Outcome B = Dif in Average Whole Grain Expenditure before package 
change 
 
 
0.734 0.634 0.808 0.827 0.794 0.935 
 
 
-0.5258 -0.4823 -0.5263 -0.4322 -0.4507 -0.4213 
 
     
 
  
 
Outcome C = Dif in Average Whole Grain Expenditure after package change 
 
 
1.23 1.399* 1.486** 1.493** 1.543*** 1.695*** 
 
 
-0.5966 -0.5423 -0.4831 -0.4967 -0.4587 -0.4196 
 
     
 
  
 
Outcome D = Dif in Dif in Average Whole Grain Expenditure over WIC 
package changes  
 
 
0.496 0.735 0.678 0.666 0.748 0.76 
 
 
-0.4292 -0.4492 -0.3895 -0.3893 -0.4027 -0.341 
 
     
 
  
 
Number of observations 
 
 
448 448 448 448 448 448 
 
 
Number of treated(WIC ever) matched  
   
 
 
175 177 177 177 177 177 
 
 
Number of untreated(never WIC) matched  
   
  173 262 268 271 271 271   
Source: Nielsen Homescan 2008- 2010 
 
 
 
76 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 The distribution of the estimated propensity scores 
 Source: Nielsen Homescan 2008-2010 
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APPENDIX A. ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR CHAPTER 3 
 
Appendix 3.1 Policy Implementation Dates: Month in 2009 when State WIC Agencies 
implemented the food package revisions  
State Month in 2009 
Delaware, New York January 
Kentucky, South Carolina May 
Colorado June 
Utah July 
Illinois, Kansas, Michigan, Oklahoma, Oregon, 
Wisconsin 
August  
Minnesota, South Dakota  September  
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, 
Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, 
Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, 
North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
Tennessee,  Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, 
West Virginia, Wyoming, District of Columbia  
October 
Montana November  
Note: List does not include Indian Tribal Organizations (ITO). 
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Appendix 3.2 The distribution of WIC reporting and eligible HHs with three-year reporting 
 Table of Elig status by WIC status 
Frequency Elig status WIC status 
Percent never 08only 09only 10only 08 & 09 08 & 10 09 & 10 08,09 & 10 Total 
 08only 445 10 2 1 2 0 0 1 461 
 13.89 0.31 0.06 0.03 0.06 0 0 0.03 14.39 
           
 09only 223 4 0 1 0 0 1 0 229 
 6.96 0.12 0 0.03 0 0 0.03 0 7.15 
           
 10only 367 7 9 9 4 3 4 3 406 
 11.46 0.22 0.28 0.28 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.09 12.68 
           
 08 & 09 306 7 0 0 5 1 1 3 323 
 9.55 0.22 0 0 0.16 0.03 0.03 0.09 10.08 
           
 08 & 10 116 4 1 2 1 0 2 1 127 
 3.62 0.12 0.03 0.06 0.03 0 0.06 0.03 3.97 
           
 09 & 10 272 10 5 2 5 5 1 2 302 
 8.49 0.31 0.16 0.06 0.16 0.16 0.03 0.06 9.43 
           
 08,09 & 10 1162 77 18 19 18 22 11 28 1355 
 36.28 2.4 0.56 0.59 0.56 0.69 0.34 0.87 42.3 
           
 Total 2891 119 35 34 35 31 20 38 3203 
  90.26 3.72 1.09 1.06 1.09 0.97 0.62 1.19 100 
Source: Nielsen Homescan 2008- 2010
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Appendix 3.3 The distribution of WIC reporting and eligible HHs with three-year grain purchases 
  Table of Elig status by WIC status 
Frequency Elig status WIC status 
Percent never 08only 09only 10only 08 & 09 08 & 10 09 & 10 08,09 & 10 Total 
 08only 444 10 2 1 2 0 0 1 460 
 13.88 0.31 0.06 0.03 0.06 0 0 0.03 14.38 
           
 09only 222 4 0 1 0 0 1 0 228 
 6.94 0.13 0 0.03 0 0 0.03 0 7.13 
           
 10only 367 7 9 9 4 3 4 3 406 
 11.48 0.22 0.28 0.28 0.13 0.09 0.13 0.09 12.7 
           
 08 & 09 306 7 0 0 5 1 1 3 323 
 9.57 0.22 0 0 0.16 0.03 0.03 0.09 10.1 
           
 08 & 10 116 4 1 2 1 0 2 1 127 
 3.63 0.13 0.03 0.06 0.03 0 0.06 0.03 3.97 
           
 09 & 10 272 10 5 2 5 5 1 2 302 
 8.51 0.31 0.16 0.06 0.16 0.16 0.03 0.06 9.44 
           
 08,09 & 10 1159 77 18 19 18 22 11 28 1352 
 36.24 2.41 0.56 0.59 0.56 0.69 0.34 0.88 42.28 
           
 Total 2886 119 35 34 35 31 20 38 3198 
  90.24 3.72 1.09 1.06 1.09 0.97 0.63 1.19 100 
Source: Nielsen Homescan 2008-2010 
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CHAPTER 4. UPSTREAM AND DOWNSTREAM STRATEGIC FOOD 
SAFETY INTERACTIONS
26
 
 
1. Introduction 
When making final preparations for home meals, the preparers’ views on ingredient 
wholesomeness matter. These views determine effort at the last defense for preventing 
foodborne illnesses. For example, the risk of cross-contamination can be reduced by washing 
hands and cutting boards in meal preparation, and by keeping food at the right temperature. 
Thoroughly cooking meats and raw eggs might be one good way to reduce the risk of 
infection by pathogens such as E. coli O157:H7.  
That consumer’s practice toward food safety plays an important role in reducing 
food-related risk has been firmly established across a wide variety of practices. The scope of 
analyses on consumer food handling is varied. Literature specific to food safety behaviors 
considers practices such as cleaning the kitchen area, transporting and storing of selected 
foods, keeping food temperatures, and cooking hamburgers (Fein et al., 2011; Mattick et al., 
2003; Godwin and Coppings, 2005; Hudson and Walley, 2009; Ralston et al., 2001). 
Meanwhile, much of the economics literature on food safety presumes that the 
household, and specifically the main meal preparer, practices safe food handling and studies 
concentrate more on controls at the food producer sectors. In the literature related to 
consumer responses to food safety signals, studies mainly focus on the effects of information 
and quality of food, food safety risk, the effects of food safety incidents and shocks, and the 
value that consumers place on food safety (Piggott et al., 2007; Jensen and Choi, 1991; 
                                                 
26
 An earlier version was prepared and presented as a Selected Paper at the Agricultural & Applied Economics 
Association’s 2014 AAEA Annual Meeting, Minneapolis, MN, July 27-29, 2014. 
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Grunert, 2005; Arnade et al., 2008; Kivi and Shogren, 2010).  
A gap exists in the literature in regard to economic analyses of how the consumer’s 
protection incentives affect the risk of food-borne illnesses. Little is known about modeling 
the consumer’s decision-making process in regard to own food safety efforts. The oversight 
is important because the benefit to be derived from policies that seek to influence on-farm 
and processor food safety efforts will depend upon how consumer efforts adjust to these 
policies.  
In this study, we investigate strategic interactions among food safety efforts by 
upstream food processors and downstream consumers in the presence of uncertainty. One of 
the few studies to examine such interactions is Elbasha and Riggs (2003). They investigate a 
simultaneous-move game solving Nash equilibrium for food safety efforts when losses are 
incident on both parties. While their model presumes simultaneous moves, in reality 
consumers make decisions later and have reason to take producer actions as given so that a 
natural alternative is to posit an upstream firm as first mover and consumers as second-
movers. Our Stackelberg model setting is more similar to Roe (2004). Roe (2004) compares 
liability assignment rules for a consumer and producer, both risk neutral, in a two-stage 
decision setting and provides an in-depth investigation of damage function non-convexities. 
He contrasts the impacts of strict liability with negligence liability rules. We will also make 
this comparison. 
Our analysis is distinct in several ways. The model considers asymmetric timing in 
moves, thus allowing the upstream agent to move first. By contrast with earlier work we 
allow for risk aversion on the consumer’s part so that the uncertainty that is an essential 
feature of food safety events has implications for consumer behavior. Finally the timing and 
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risk aversion dimensions in our model allow for policy analyses not available in earlier 
works, and we follow through on these opportunities. 
Our analysis contrasts food safety incentives and outcomes across two dimensions, 
technology and liability assignment. In the technology contrast, food safety effort by each 
party can be either a success or a failure and we assume statistical independence between the 
success probabilities. Given this, however, two very different maps between effort outcomes 
and food safety outcomes are considered: weakest link and best shot (Hirshleifer, 1983). In 
weakest link if one or both of two actions fails then the outcome is a failure, i.e., a food 
safety event occurs. This relationship is an instance of complementary interactions between 
efforts because the marginal value of one entity’s effort increases with the other entity’s 
effort level. In best shot if either or both of the actions is a success then the food is safe. In 
this case efforts are substitutes in that one party’s effort has less impact at the margin when 
the other party increases effort. We examine how the sort of technical interaction between 
upstream and downstream efforts affects behavior strategies when responded to food safety 
risk.  
The second contrast is between incentives under different liability rules. 
Accommodating the liability rules for food safety has received attention in the food safety 
literature (Rouvière and Caswell, 2012; Pouliot and Sumner, 2008; Buzby and Frenzen, 
1999; Roe, 2004). Roe (2004) is the closest in spirit to our work in that it also considers two 
liability rules- strict liability and negligence in a bilateral accident setting. However, the 
current study differs in having a richer technological structure, including risk aversion and 
allowing for conjectures other than nash. 
The analysis in this paper is founded on the framework of self-protection and self-
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insurance facing food safety risk. As probability and severity are the two elements that define 
risk, decreasing either element, privately or collectively, can reduce risk (Shogren, 1990; 
Ehrlich and Becker, 1972). Ehrlich and Becker (1972) defined and systematically illustrated 
self-protection, a reduction in loss probability, and self-insurance, a reduction in loss size. 
We explicitly examine the self-protection incentives of both consumer and producer 
to decrease the probability of food safety risk with the fixed severity of a loss under the 
assumption that there is no self-insurance motive to decrease the size of loss. The relevant 
example of an undesirable environmental externality in the self-selection literature is 
investigated in Shogren and Crocker (1991). Shogren and Crocker (1991) analyze self-
protection investments by cooperative and noncooperative agents for transferable externality 
and extend the model to a Stackelberg two-stage game to examine the effects of strategic 
commitment upon self-protection. However, the association between self-protection and risk 
aversion is absent in their study.  
The relationship between self-protection incentive and risk aversion is an intriguing 
issue (Lee, 2012; Briys and Schlesinger, 1990; Dionne and Eeckhoudt, 1985). For example, 
Dionne and Eeckhoudt (1985) and Briys and Schlesinger (1990) demonstrate that self-
insurance efforts increases as risk aversion increases, but this is not necessarily true for self-
protection efforts (Jullien et al., 1999). In this paper, we explore how risk aversion affects 
consumer and upstream behavior, where it is known that more risk-averse agents may 
possibly protect less. As far as we know, none of the extant literature on self-protection 
incentives considers strategic issues. 
The paper is organized as follows. We first explain our general two-stage model set-
up, which allows for different technologies as well as for different liability rules. The first-
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best choices are identified. Turning to strategic settings, we develop incentives under four 
settings (weakest link, best shot) ⨉ (strict liability, negligence). We use backward induction 
to solve the expected utility maximization problem for a downstream consumer in Stage II. 
Then we solve for the upstream processor’s Stage I cost minimization problem to obtain the 
optimal levels of preventative effort. After solving for the Stackelberg equilibrium in each 
case, comparative statics are provided to ascertain strategic interactions between both efforts 
as well as how consumer risk aversion affects each effort type. We close with a summary and 
discussions of policy implications. 
 
2. Model Set-up 
We model a single upstream food processor and a representative downstream food 
user. The user could be a restaurant or an at-home consumer. Actions are taken at two time 
points, or stages. At Stage I the upstream firm takes action f at cost fx . At later Stage II the 
consumer takes action c costing cx . The consumer moves in full knowledge of the firm’s 
earlier action. Food price is fixed throughout the analysis and will be ignored. Two liability 
rules are considered, strict liability and negligence. One intent in this inquiry is to relate these 
rules to technical settings. Under strict liability, which we label as SL, the upstream firm is 
liable whenever a food incident occurs. Under negligence, labeled as N, the firm is liable 
whenever the firm is negligent even if the consumer’s action does not succeed. Let ( )cG x  
and ( )fH x  be the respective probabilities that the consumer and firm succeed in their part 
when securing safe food. Respective first derivatives are given by ( )cg x  and ( )fh x . 
Probabilities of failure in either task are written with a bar on top, i.e., ( )cG x  and ( )fH x . 
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We assume that these events are independent, but how success in these activities maps into 
safe food is another matter.  
In the manner of a copula (Sklar, 1959), these success probabilities combine to form 
the cumulative probability of having safe food to eat as [ ( ), ( )]c fJ G x H x . Where convenient, 
to simplify notation we will write ( , )c fJ x x  for short. Each action has positive but declining 
marginal impact on this outcome, i.e., ( ) 0cJ   , ( ) 0fJ   , ( ) 0ccJ    and ( ) 0ffJ   . Actions 
involve self-protection in the sense of Ehrlich and Becker (1972), i.e., they affect state 
probabilities and not state outcomes. It remains to state and then motivate the structure of 
( , )J   . 
Weakest Link Assumption 
The weakest link, or WL, technology setting is when ( , ) ( ) ( )c f c fJ x x G x H x , i.e., 
both firm and consumer must succeed if the food is to be safe. Notice that ( ) 0cfJ   , i.e., 
efforts are technical complements in the most direct sense. As the weakest link terminology 
suggests, efforts are likely to complement when the intent of both is to keep a pathogen out. 
An instance is washing activities, which occurs on packing lines and in kitchens. A 
contamination event will occur if either a processor or at home user allows produce to be 
contaminated. In this case, Pr(fse: ff ) 1  and Pr(fse: fs) ( )cG x  where we use ‘fse’ for 
‘food safety event,’ ‘ff’ for ‘firm fails,’ and ‘fs’ for ‘firm succeeds.’ Thus, 
Pr(fse) ( , ) 1 ( ) ( )c f c fJ x x G x H x    in the case of weakest link. 
Best Shot Assumption 
The best shot, or BS, technology setting is when ( , ) 1 ( ) ( )c f c fJ x x G x H x  , i.e., it is 
only necessary that one or other party succeeds for the food to be safe. Here, ( ) 0cfJ    so 
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that efforts are technical substitutes in this very direct sense. Efforts are likely to substitute 
when the intent of both is to kill a pathogen that is already in, so that cooking and irradiation 
(microwave) are examples. If either effort succeeds then the problem has been addressed. In 
this case, Pr(fse: ff ) ( )cG x  and Pr(fse: fs) 0 . 
We model the impact of damage through scaling factor 
De  on consumer utility. 
Quantity L  is the monetary liability faced by the upstream firm, while [0,1]   indicates 
extent of traceability/transparency which we take to be the fraction of liability that is 
collected. Damage and traceability parameters allow us to consider policy interventions 
through government penalties, court imposed fines and public investments in tracing 
technologies. The model can be adapted to accommodate alternative forms of policy 
intervention. Roe (2004) and Pouliot and Sumner (2008) study related, but distinct problems, 
absent risk aversion and strategic dimensions. Elbasha and Riggs (2003) do consider the 
strategic dimensions but absent risk aversion and presuming simultaneous moves. 
The consumer is held to have initial wealth w , CARA risk preferences (wealth)e   and 
risk aversion parameter 0  , so that utility in the healthy state is ( )cw xe    and utility in 
the unhealthy state is 
( ) ( )c cw x L D w x LDe e e
           . Note here that damage and income 
considerations enter the utility function in distinct ways, where income/wealth effects are 
mediated by the degree of risk aversion but damage is not. In this way we separate monetary 
risk preferences from preferences over adverse health events. We assume that D L  so 
that compensation does not exceed damage. As liability and the traceability/transparency 
index enter in a multiplicative manner throughout, for the sake of simplicity we will write 
P L  from this juncture on. We intend for P  to be interpreted broadly, to include 
marketplace penalty for damage to reputation as well as any direct regulatory penalty. Also, 
due to the CARA utility structure, wealth w  may be ignored and we will do so from this 
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point on. 
The upstream firm is risk-neutral and seeks to minimize the expected sum of 
preventive and liability costs while recognizing the consumer’s reaction. The four (WL, BS) 
⨉ (SL, N) settings lead to the following four objective functions for the firm’s Stage I 
problem; 
(1)  
*,WL,SL
*,
*,BS
*,
*,BS
SL:     min [1 ( ( )) ( )] ,
WL min ( , ( ))
N : min ( ) ,
SL:     min ( ( )) ( ) ,
BS min ( , ( ))
N : min ( ( )) ( ) .
f
f
f
f
f
f
x f c f f
x f c f
x f f
x f c f f
x f c f
x f c f f
x G x x H x P
C x x x
x H x P
x G x x H x P
C x x x
x G x x H x P


  

 

 

 

 
with generic solution *,
fx
 . The determination of *,WL,SL ( )c fx x  and 
*,BS( )c fx x  will be explained 
shortly. 
Several comments are in order concerning (1) above. One is that under BS the Stage I 
incentive structures are the same for the firm regardless of liability rule. Were the firm to 
succeed in its task then the liability rule does not matter. Were the firm to fail then the events 
of strict liability and negligence are synonymous. The second is that for either rule expected 
costs are weakly larger under WL than under BS as there are more ways to fail under WL. 
Under WL too, expected costs are larger when the strict liability rule applies than when the 
negligence rule applies as the firm’s probability of incurring a fine is larger when subject to 
the strict liability rule. In addition, for WL the expected cost reduces to the same expression 
under either rule when *,( ( )) 1c fG x x
  . If the consumer always succeeds then the distinction 
between liability rules is moot regardless of technology form. Finally, the negligence rule 
possesses an interesting strategic consequence when the technology is WL. Then the firm is 
always found to be negligent when it fails because success in its task is essential. This 
essentiality separates the firm’s choice from the consumer’s choice and the firm has no 
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strategic motive to act, where by strategic motive we mean an intent to influence choice cx . 
By contrast, when the technology is BS then the firm may seek to underinvest in effort and 
force the consumer to incur the food safety cost. 
Corresponding to (1), there are three Stage II consumer problems. For WL and SL the 
consumer’s problem is to  
(2)  ( )WL,SLmax ( , ) max [1 ( ) ( )] ( ) ( ) ,c c
c c
D x P x
x c f x c f c fU x x G x H x e G x H x e
       
with generic solution *,WL,SL( )c fx x . Here there are two possible outcomes;  
i) where there is not a fse (occurring with probability ( ) ( )c fG x H x ), and  
ii) where there is a fse so that the firm pays P (occurring with probability 
1 ( ) ( )c fG x H x ). 
For WL and N the problem is 
(3) 
 ( )WL,Nmax ( , ) max ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,c c c
c c
D x D x P x
x c f x c f f c fU x x G x H x e H x e G x H x e
         
with generic solution *,WL,N ( )c fx x . Here there are three possible outcomes; 
i) as above, where there is not a fse (occurring with probability ( ) ( )c fG x H x ), 
ii) where there is a fse, the firm failed and pays P (occurring with probability 
( ) ( )c fG x H x  ( ) ( ) ( )c f fG x H x H x  where the first left-hand term represents failure by the 
firm only and the second left-hand term represents failure by both firm and consumer), and 
iii) where there is a fse, the firm did not fail and P is not paid (occurring with 
probability ( ) ( )c fG x H x ). 
For BS and either liability rule the problem is 
(4)  ( )BSmax ( , ) max ( ) ( ) [1 ( ) ( )] .c c
c c
D x P x
x c f x c f c fU x x G x H x e G x H x e
       
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with generic solution *,BS( )c fx x . Here there are two possible outcomes;  
 i) where there is not a fse (occurring with probability 1 ( ) ( )c fG x H x ), and  
ii) where there is a fse so that the firm must have failed and consequently the firm 
pays P. 
We seek to understand the nature of the different reaction function *, ( )c fx x
  that arise 
in the consumer problem, including conditions under which *, ( )c fx x
  is monotone. This will 
allow us to understand the nature of incentives facing the upstream firm. Were *, ( )c fx x
  
increasing then the upstream firm will be incentivized to encourage consumer protection by 
applying high effort itself. Were the function decreasing then the upstream firm will have 
incentives to free-ride, placing the burden on the consumer. We also seek to understand how 
*,
fx
  is affected by policy and related parameters. Finally, we seek to understand how risk 
aversion parameter   affects consumer and upstream behavior, where it is known that more 
risk averse agents may be incentivized to protect less, see, e.g., Jullien et al. (1999). Given 
the problem’s temporal structure the approach taken is, of course, to first solve Stage II and 
then allow the firm to use imputed reaction functions when acting in Stage I. 
 
3. First-Best Outcomes 
Weakest Link Assumption 
Under the weakest-link technology, the consumer’s expected utility may be written as  
(5)  
( , )WL,SL ˆ( , ) [1 ( ) ( )] ( ) ( ) ,c f c c
r x x D x x
c f c f c fU x x u e G x H x e G x H x e
           
so that certainty equivalent is 
(6)  
1
1
( , ) ln (1 )
ln [1 ( ) ( )] ( ) ( ) .
c cD x x
c f
D
c f c f c
r x x p e pe
G x H x e G x H x x
 



     
      
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Therefore we may write aggregate certainty equivalent return as the difference between 
consumer certainty equivalent and firm effort;
27
 
(7)  1( , ) ln [1 ( ) ( )] ( ) ( ) .Dc f f c f c f c fr x x x G x H x e G x H x x x
           
This reveals that the welfare maximization problem may be posed as  
(8)  
( ) ( )
,max [1 ( ) ( )] ( ) ( ) ,
c f c f
c f
D x x x x
x x c f c fG x H x e G x H x e
   
    
and optimality conditions are  
(9)  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ; ;
1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .
D
c f c f D
c f c f
e
G x H x g x H x
e
G x H x G x h x

  
 
  

 
 
Some manipulation then delivers 
(10)  
( )( )
;
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .
fc
c f
c f c f
h xg x
G x H x
G x H x g x H x 

 
 
The first of these two optimality conditions shows that, whenever ( )G   and ( )H   are 
both logconcave (Bagnoli and Bergstrom, 2005), higher first-best values of cx  and fx  will 
rise or fall together. Consequently it is readily apparent that an increase in risk aversion 
parameter   will lead to an increase in first-best levels of both effort choices. 
Best Shot Assumption 
Under the best-shot technology, the consumer’s expected utility is given as  
(11)  
( , )BS,SL ˆ( , ) (1 ) ; 1 ( ) ( ),c f c c
r x x D x x
c f c fU x x u e p e pe p G x H x
             
so that aggregate certainty equivalent return can be written as  
(12)   1( , ) ln ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) .Dc f f c f c f c fr x x x G x H x e G x H x x x           
The welfare maximization problem may be posed as  
                                                 
27
 Notice that penalty is a transfer and so would not enter the calculation. 
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(13)  
( ) ( )
,max ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) .
c f c f
c f
D x x x x
x x c f c fG x H x e G x H x e
   
      
First-order conditions are  
(14)  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ;
( 1)
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .
( 1)
c f c f D D
c f c f D D
G x H x g x H x
e e
G x H x G x h x
e e
 

 

 
  

 
  

 
If we set ( ) 1 c
x
cG x e
   and ( ) 1 f
x
fH x e

   then the optimality conditions become 
and first-order conditions are  
(15)  
( ) ;
1
( ) .
1
c f
c f
x x
D
x x
D
e
e
e
e
 
 

 

 
 
 
 

 

 
The conditions reveal that, with the given technologies the efforts are perfect substitutes up 
to a productivity scaling factor, the socially optimal solution is to use only the more cost 
effective effort. Use only consumer effort whenever   , only upstream effort whenever 
  , and be indifferent whenever they are equally productive. When    then the 
socially optimal effort levels are so 1 1ln[ / ( )] ln[1/ ( 1)]Dcx e    
       and 
so 0fx  . 
When    then the socially optimal effort levels are so 0cx   and 
so 1 1ln[ / ( )] ln[1/ ( 1)]Dfx e    
      . Notice that in either case first-best effort 
declines with an increase in risk aversion. The reason for this peculiarity is the input’s self-
protective nature.  
 
4. Backward Induction 
Stage II, when Firm Moves First 
In this section we seek to understand the consumer’s optimal choice in light of the 
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firm’s decision so as to understand consumer reactions that the firm acting at Stage I can seek 
to manipulate. We assume that the cost function is convex, but will return to the issue when 
considering specific examples. Throughout we set ( ) 1 c
x
cG x e
   and ( ) 1 f
x
fH x e

  . It 
is assumed throughout that   , i.e., that the effort sensitive of consumer’s probability of 
task failure ln[ ( )] /c cd G x dx    is large when compared with degree of risk aversion. Why 
this assumption is needed is explained in the appendix, where Stackelberg second-order 
conditions are established. Were risk aversion the larger of the two then corner solutions 
would be supported in that consumers would have unlimited incentive to protect and so 
reduce risk exposure.  
 
Weakest Link and Strict Liability 
In the case of objective function (2), the first-order optimality condition resolves to 
(16)  ( ) ; ; 1.
11
c
f
x D P
x
M
e M e
Me
 


   


      

 
where we write the solution as *,WL,SL( )c fx x . Letting / ( )     , some algebra establishes 
(17) 
 *,WL,SL
1 1 1 1
( ) ln( 1) ln(1 ) ln( ) ln(1 ).f f f
x D P x xD P
c fx x e e e e
   
   
             
Notice here that the term 1 ln( )   is decreasing in   so that the value of *,WL,SL ( )c fx x  may 
well decrease in the degree of risk aversion even absent any consideration on how firm effort 
is impacted by risk aversion. As to why this is possibility arises, bear in mind that cx  is a 
self-protection input impacting probability of loss and not state-conditioned extent of loss, 
see eqn. (2). 
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Weakest Link and Negligence 
In the case of objective function (3) the optimality condition resolves to 
(18)  ( )( 1)(1 ) ( 1).f f fc
x D P x xxDe e e e e
     
          
Consequently,  
(19)  
*,WL,N
*,WL,SL
1 1 1 1
( ) ln(1 ) ln( 1) ln( ) ln( 1)
1 1
( ) ln .
1
f f fx D P x x D
c f
D
c f D P
x x e e e e
e
x x
e
   

   

   

        
 
   
 
 
and 
(20)  
*,WL,N *,WL,SL( ) ( )
0.
( 1)(1 )
f
f f f
xD P
c f c f
D P x x x
f f
dx x dx x e e
dx dx e e e

   



   
  
  
 
So under the weakest-link technology and either, actions are complementary in the sense of 
technological inputs. 
Remark 1: Under the weakest-link technology and either liability structure, the consumer’s 
reaction to an increase in processor food safety effort is to also increase effort. 
It follows that any policy intervention intent on increasing firm effort should have a 
positive strategic impact on consumer effort. 
 
Best Shot 
In the case of BS, the first-order condition arising from (4) resolves to  
(21) 
*
;
1
f
c
x
x
D P
e
e
e








 
with solution *,BS( )c fx x . Solving explicitly, we have 
(22) *,BS
1 1
( ) ln( 1) ln( ) ,D Pc f fx x e x
 
  
      
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revealing that efforts are perfect substitutes. The consumer’s reaction function is 
characterized by derivative *,BS( ) / / 0c f fdx x dx      so that we may assert; 
Remark 2: Under the best-shot technology and either liability structure, the consumer’s 
reaction is to decrease effort (and in linear manner) in response to an increase in processor 
food safety. 
A comparison of remarks 1 and 2 shows that the qualitative nature of consumer 
reactions to firm choices will depend upon the technology setting, where our view is that 
both weakest link and best shot technologies are plausible approximations to reality.  
 
Stage I 
We turn now to firm choice. In addition to managing direct effects of effort on effort 
costs and any liabilities, the firm can take advantage of strategic opportunities to guide the 
consumer’s behavior. (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1984). These strategic opportunities are the 
matter of this section. 
 
Weakest-Link and Strict Liability 
Insert expression (17) for *,WL,SL( )c fx x  into ( ) 1
cx
cG x e
   to obtain 
(23) *,WL,SL( ( )) 1 .
( 1)(1 )f
D P
c f xD P
e
G x x
e e





 
 
 
so that the appropriate objective function is 
(24) 
*,WL,SLmin ( , ( )) min (1 ) .
1
f
f f
D P
x
x f c f x f D P
e P
C x x x x P e P
e







    

 
Thus, the optimality condition is 
*,WL,SL
(1 ) f
x
P e

   with explicit solution 
*,WL,SL
fx 
1 ln[(1 ) ]P   . The expression is independent of D  but not of  . Figure 4.1 
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depicts how *,WL,SLfx  is determined. As 
*,WL,SL 0fx   if and only if 
*,WL,SL
1f
x
e

 , it follows that, 
for weakest-link and strict liability, 0fx   if and only if (1 ) 1P  . This observation will 
prove to be useful when interpreting expressions to follow. Differentiate the optimality 
condition to obtain  
(25)  
*,WL,SL *,WL,SL
1 1
0; 0;
( )
f fdx dx
dP P d    
   

 
comparative statics that are readily discerned from Figure 4.1. 
Remark 3: Under the weakest-link technology and strict liability structure, the firm 
increases effort as the penalty increases and also as the consumer’s level of risk aversion 
increases. 
The origin of the response to a penalty is clear, that of the response to risk aversion 
less so. As already noted, the consumer’s response to risk aversion is compromised due to the 
self-protective nature of effort. Given the complementarity embedded in the weakest-link 
technology (see Remark 1) and strict liability, and to the extent that consumer response to 
risk aversion is muted, the firm has a strong self interest in stepping up its protective effort to 
limit probability of liability. Perhaps counterintuitively, the firm’s action may conceivably be 
more sensitive to consumer risk aversion than the consumer’s own effort. 
For interior solutions, 
*,WL,SL
*( ) 1 ( ) / ( )f
x
fH x e P P

   

     . From (17) then 
we have  
(26) *,WL,SL
1 1 ( ) 1
ln( 1) ln ln( ).
D P
D P
c
e P
x e
P

     
     

          
  
  
Next, from (26),  
(27) 
*,WL,SL 2 2 2 2 2( 1) 1
.
[( )( 1) ]( 1) ( ) ( )
D P D P
c
D P D P
dx e P e P
d e P e P
 
 
    
           
 
 
   
 
      
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To ascertain that this response can be negative, let /P D   so that *,WL,SL /cdx d  . 
On the other hand, when ( ) / ( )P      then the first right hand term is finite but the 
second right hand term converges on value 1
0
lim 1/

 

 . As the penalty facing the 
firm grows the consumer sees the probability and cost of loss decrease and so risk aversion 
ceases to be a motivation for effort. 
Now differentiate with respect to the penalty: 
(28) 
*,WL,SL
sign
( )( 1) ( )
( 1)( ) ( )( 1)
1 ( ).
D P D P
c
D P D P
D P
dx e P P e
dP e P e P
e P P
 
 

      
     

  
 
 
 

     
  
         
    

 
The sign is undetermined without further assumptions. Two forces are at play. 
Complementarity suggests that an increase in penalty that elicits more processor effort should 
also elicit more consumer effort. On the other hand, strict liability creates a form of moral 
hazard such that the consumer may seek to lean on firm efforts. It is clear from (28) that if 
both the penalty and the coefficient of risk aversion are low then consumer effort will 
respond positively to a penalty. We saw above that when the penalty is low then consumer 
effort increases strongly to an increase in degree of risk aversion, because level of effort is 
very low. However, as the coefficient of risk aversion increases then consumer effort 
becomes less responsive to the penalty. When risk aversion is strong then the consumer is 
likely already applying much effort. Given strict liability, when the penalty increases then the 
consumer sees advantage in handing over food safety responsibilities to the firm and cutting 
effort costs.  
 
WL and Negligence 
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From (1), the goal is to min f
f
x
x fx e P

 , so the first-order condition is 1 f
x
e P



  
and the optimal solution is *,WL,N 1 ln( )fx P 
  where 1P   is required to ensure an 
interior solution, i.e., if 1P   then *,WL,N 0fx   so that the firm accepts penalty P  with 
certainty.  
Three contrasts are apparent with *,WL,SL
fx  as arrived at from (24). One is that, as the 
objective function makes transparent, the firm’s optimal choice under the negligence rule is 
independent of D  and  . Firm incentives are not coupled with consumer incentives. 
Another is that strict liability provides stronger incentives to the firm, i.e., 
(29) *,WL,SL *,WL,N
1
ln( ) 0.f fx x

     
The third is that this difference is independent of the penalty’s magnitude, P , which, as in 
(19) for consumer efforts, has a common effect on each effort level and nets out. 
Remark 4: Under the weakest-link technology, optimal firm effort when subject to strict 
liability exceeds optimal effort when subject to the negligence rule and the difference is 
increasing in the consumer’s level of risk aversion. 
 
Risk aversion matters only under strict liability because then the firm can be liable 
when failure occurs on the consumer side. As a consequence, and in light of the technical 
complementarity pointed out in Remark 1, the firm possesses a strategic motive that does not 
exist under the negligence legal rule. 
Insert *,WL,N 1 ln( )fx P 
  into the Stage II optimality condition for WL and N, or 
(19), to obtain  
(30) *,WL,N
1 1 1 1
ln( 1) ln( 1) ln( 1) ln( ).D P Dcx P e P e
 
   
          
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It follows that  
(31) 
*,WL,N 2( ) ( 1)
,
( 1)( )
D P
c
D P
dx e P P P
d e P


    
    


   

  
 
and  
(32) 
*,WL,N
[ ( 1)]
0,
( 1)( 1)
D P
c
D P
dx P e
dP P e P


  
  


 
 
  
 
given the assumption that 1P  . Regarding (31), the denominator is certainly positive. If 
2 0P P      then the numerator is negative and *,WL,N / 0cdx d  . The quadratic’s 
maximum value is when / 2   so that it suffices to know whether 4P  . Thus in the 
negligence setting, 
*,WL,N / 0cdx d   whenever 4 / 1/P   . So, assuming that penalty P  
is low and firm effort is interior, the comparatively more risk averse consumer takes less 
effort. Again, the effort’s self-protective nature is manifest. 
Remark 5: Under the weakest-link technology, the negligence liability rule, and interior firm 
effort, the privately optimal level of consumer effort is i) increasing in the level of penalty, 
and ii) decreasing in the level of risk aversion whenever 4 / 1/P   .  
We turn now to a direct comparison of consumer effort across liability rules. From 
differencing (26) and (30) we have  
(33) *,WL,SL *,WL,N
0 0
1 ( 1)( ) 1 1
ln ln .
( 1)[( ) ] 1
D P D P
c c D D P
e P e P
x x
e e P P
 

   
       
 

 
       
     
        
  
Without further information we cannot establish whether the consumer facing the weakest 
link technology when under the strict liability rule takes more effort than when under the 
negligence rule. We know from Remark 4 that the firm takes more effort when under the 
strict liability rule. Given complementarity, this should promote comparatively more 
consumer effort under the strict liability rule. On the other hand, the user’s loss under strict 
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liability are comparatively lower and so moral hazard effects will be comparatively stronger 
under the strict liability rule.  
To probe the matter further, suppose that the penalty is as large as we will allow it to 
be, specifically when /P D  . Then 
(34) 
2
*,WL,SL *,WL,N 1 (1 1)( )ln 0.
( 1) ( )
c c D
D
x x
e D
  
   
   
   
  
 
Alternatively, suppose that the penalty is low, such that 1P  . Then  
(35) 
/ /
*,WL,SL *,WL,N
/
negative and finite
1 ( 1) 1
ln ln .
( 1)[( ) ] 1
D D
c c D D
e e
x x
e e P
   
 

     
 


   
     
      
  
Remark 6: In weakest link, when the penalty is sufficiently 
i) low then consumer effort under strict liability exceeds that under negligence; 
ii) high then consumer effort under strict liability is lower than under negligence. 
As to why these outcomes arise, when the penalty is high and the rule is strict liability 
then the consumer is better able to free-ride off the firm. When the penalty is low then the 
firm takes little effort and is likely to be deemed negligent. There is little incentive to free-
ride off firm effort but the strategic motive to respond positively to any firm effort remains.  
 
Best Shot 
From (1), the goal is to *min ( ( )) ( )
fx f c f f
x G x x H x P . From (21), we have  
(36) 
*,BS
*,BS( ( )) .
1
fx
c f D P
e
G x x
e





 
Therefore, 
*,BS( ( )) ( ) 1/ ( 1)D Pc f fG x x H x e
   and the goal becomes 
(37) min ,
1f
x f D P
P
x
e 



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with solution *,BS 0fx  . The firm, having the first-move, exploits the opportunity to impose 
the cost of food safety effort on the consumer. From (22) then we have  
(38) *,BS
1 1
ln( 1) ln( ),D Pcx e

 
     
so that  
(39) 
*,BS
*,BS
1
0;
( 1) ( )
0.
( 1)
D P
c
D P
D P
c
D P
dx Pe
d e
dx e
dP e




    






   
 
  

 
Remark 7: Under best-shot, the consumer’s effort declines as the consumer’s level of risk 
aversion increases and also as the penalty increases.  
As under weakest-link, the response to degree of risk aversion arises from the input’s 
self-protective nature. Turning to the adverse penalty response, this is most disturbing from 
the policy viewpoint. Due to moral hazard effects, under either liability rule an increase in 
penalty reduces consumer incentive to care while the firm’s concern about the penalty is 
dominated by its desire to foist caretaking responsibility on the consumer. The penalty does 
not encourage the firm to take effort, but the prospect of compensation discourages the 
consumer from taking effort. The policy intervention is ineffective. 
Remark 8: Under best-shot and either liability rule, the probability of a food safety event 
increases as the penalty imposed for a failure increases.  
 
We turn now to a comparison with outcomes under simultaneous moves. 
 
5. Simultaneous Moves 
In this section we modify firm and consumer objective functions to the simultaneous 
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moves context. Notice from (1) that the  
(40)  
2
0 for WL and SL,
( , )
0 for N,
0 for BS.
f c
f c
d C x x
dx dx





 
Thus, the firm facing a weakest-link technology and strict liability has marginal cost that is 
decreasing in consumer effort while the firm facing a best-shot technology has a marginal 
cost that is increasing in consumer effort.  
From (1), it is also noteworthy that  
(41)  
2
2
0 for WL and SL,
( , )
0 for N,
0 for BS;
0 for WL and SL,
( , )
0 for N,
0 for BS.
f c
f
f c
c
d C x x
dx dP
d C x x
dx dP










 
So, regardless of context, the marginal cost of firm effort decreases as the penalty increases 
and the same is weakly true for the cross impact of penalty and consumer effort on marginal 
cost. 
We turn now to consumer incentives in nash equilibrium. As in (2), for WL and SL 
the consumer’s problem is to  
(42)  ( )WL,SLmax ( , ) max [1 ( ) ( )] ( ) ( ) ,c c
c c
D x P x
x c f x c f c fU x x G x H x e G x H x e
       
with cross-derivative 
(43)  
2 WL,SL ( , )
( )[ ( ) ( )]( 1) .c
c f xD P
f c c
c f
d U x x
h x g x G x e e
dx dx
     
Now with ( ) 1 c
x
cG x e
   and   , the latter inequality to ensure problem convexity, then  
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(44)  
2 WL,SL ( , )
( )[( ) ]( 1) 0.c c
c f x xD P
f
c f
d U x x
h x e e e
dx dx
          
The inputs complement so that any exogenous increase in firm effort reinforces consumer 
incentives. 
For WL and N the consumer’s problem is to  
(45) 
 ( )WL,Nmax ( , ) max ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,c c c
c c
D x D x P x
x c f x c f f c fU x x G x H x e H x e G x H x e
         
and the own-effort derivative is 
(46) 
  
WL,N
( )
0
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( 1) ( ) 0,c c
x D x PD P D D
c c c f
c
dU
e G x e G x g x e e H x e
dx
      


        
so that  
(47)   
2 WL,N
0
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( 1) ( ) 0.c
xD P D D
c c c f
c f
d U
e G x e G x g x e e h x
dx dx
  


       
For BS the consumer’s problem is to  
(48)  ( )BSmax ( , ) max ( ) ( ) [1 ( ) ( )] .c c
c c
D x P x
x c f x c f c fU x x G x H x e G x H x e
       
The first-order condition can be written as  
(49)   
BS
0
( )
[ ( ) ( )]( 1) ( ) 0,c c
x xD P
c c f
c
dU
e g x G x e e H x
dx
   


       
so that  
(50)   
2 BS
0
( )
[ ( ) ( )]( 1) ( ) 0.c
xD P
c c f
c f
d U
g x G x e e h x
dx dx
 


      
Figure 4.2 depicts how the consumer’s optimality condition changes in response to an 
increase in firm effort under weakest-link and either liability rule.  
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Remark 9: Under  
i) weakest-link and either strict liability or negligence rule, nash equilibrium firm and 
consumer choices will be lower than under stackelberg;  
ii) best-shot and either rule, we cannot compare without further information. 
The reasoning for i) is that in stackelberg the firm has the opportunity to foster 
coordination through first movement.
28
 All are better off as in neither case are incentives 
sufficient to support first-best. This point has been made before by Hennessy, Roosen and 
Miranowski (2001) but in a cooperative game where surplus is shared via the Shapley value. 
The policy implications of i) are several, where three are provided below. 
Communication between the firm and the consumer is a form of first movement 
where Ellingsen and Östling (2010) have shown that communication facilitates coordination 
given positive spillover payoffs similar to those in our model. Examples of such behavior are 
not hard to find. As with other commodity organizations, the National Turkey Federation of 
the United States seeks to link with consumers through recipe books, at home food safety 
recommendations and evidence of its members’ commitment to food safety, see, e.g., 
http://www.eatturkey.com/. To be effective, communication must reach receptive ears. 
Information is more likely to have the intended effect when the message is clearly 
interpreted. Education matters, as in a basic understanding of microbiology and the chemistry 
of cooking among the general population.  
Also, in reality pre-consumer production and processing typically involve many 
agents. Concerns about suboptimal effort are likely to grow in systems that involve many 
autonomous agents processing and then trading on, see, e.g., Collins (1993). Vertical 
integration can signal to the consumer that beggar thy neighbor food safety interactions in the 
                                                 
28
 A proof can be established by arguments analogous to the proof of Proposition 1 in Hennessy, Roosen and 
Miranowski (2001). 
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marketing channel are being addressed. Chinese government concerns about loss of 
consumer confidence in its domestic production is a case in point. Commencing a decade or 
more ago, its government has sought to foster coordination through promotion of larger, 
more integrated processing firms (Gale and Hu, 2012).  
Enforced minimum processing standards are also a means of imposing first-mover 
status on the processor, though these standards will only matter if binding. The implications 
of minimum standards are most interesting for the best shot technology, bringing us to part ii) 
and more generally to policy when efforts substitute. Minimum standards will force the 
processor not to free-ride but will allow the consumer to do so. Whether the resulting 
equilibrium is socially preferred is unclear. By contrast, the case for minimum standards 
under weakest link technologies is clearer. Although processors will be better motivated in 
stackelberg than in nash, they are unlikely to apply sufficient effort. As a result, consumers 
are also unlikely to apply sufficient effort. A standard above the stackelberg level for 
processor effort is likely to improve social welfare.  
 
6. Discussion 
Food safety decisions are not made in isolation and food systems are linked in 
complex ways. The growth of downstream value added and increased specialization in the 
food chain has led to an increase in the number of chain participants. A seminal insight from 
Coase (1937) is that the boundaries of the firm matter, in part because of tradeoffs between 
agency and technical costs. These agency costs can arise from private incentives that are 
poorly aligned with social welfare and coordination failures even when incentive alignment 
is good. This paper has considered a very simple problem of strategic interaction between a 
single upstream food processor and a representative food consumer. We show how the food 
safety production technology can matter, paying particular attention to penalties and extent of 
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consumer risk aversion in determining equilibrium outcomes. We also compare with first-
best and nash equilibrium to demonstrate that a role exists for leadership in policy 
interventions.  
Several of our findings might be viewed as counterintuitive and these stem partly 
from the self-protective nature of food safety efforts. Examples are where a penalty and a 
minimum effort standard may do more harm than good while consumers may take less effort 
when they are more risk averse. The extent to which these possible outcomes arise depend on 
several factors. One is the actual technology, as in whether weakest-link and keep food safety 
problems out nature or best-shot and get rid of existing food safety problems best depicts the 
situation. Another is whether processors and consumers understand the technology that they 
are dealing with. These are matters for further investigation. 
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Figure 4.1 Firm’s effort under weakest link technology and strict liability,  
as incentives change. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Consumer’s private optimality condition, as firm effort changes. 
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APPENDIX B. ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR CHAPTER 4 
 
Second-order Conditions for the second mover consumer under stackelberg 
For WL and SL the consumer’s problem is, as in (2), to  
(A1)  ( )max ( , ) [1 ( ) ( )] ( ) ( ) .c c
c
D x P x
x c f c f c fU x x G x H x e G x H x e
       
The first-order condition is  
(A2) 
 
( )
( ) ( )( 1) [1 ( ) ( )] ( ) ( ) 0.c c c
x D x P xD P
c f c f c fg x H x e e G x H x e G x H x e
            
At a solution to this equation, the second-order condition resolves to  
(A3)  [ ( ) ( )]( 1) 0;D Pc cg x g x e
      
or ( ) / ( )c cg x g x   . That is the consumer’s success probability function should be more 
concave than her utility function. When ( ) 1 c
x
cG x e
   then the relationship resolves to 
  .  
For WL and N the problem is 
(A4)  ( )max ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,c c c
c
D x D x P x
x c f c f f c fU x x G x H x e H x e G x H x e
         
The first-order condition is  
(A5) 
 ( ) ( )( 1) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0.c c
x xD D D P
c f c f f c fg x H x e e G x H x e H x e G x H x e
          
As before the second-order condition, when evaluated at a solution to the above, resolves to 
(A6)  [ ( ) ( )]( 1) 0.D Pc cg x g x e
      
For BS and either liability rule the problem is 
(A7)  ( )max ( , ) ( ) ( ) [1 ( ) ( )] .c c
c
D x P x
x c f c f c fU x x G x H x e G x H x e
       
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The first-order condition is  
(A8)  ( ) ( )( 1) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 0.c c
x xD P D P
c f c f c fg x H x e e G x H x e G x H x e
           
As before the second-order condition, when evaluated at a solution to the above, resolves to 
(A6). So the second-order conditions sufficient for any consumer effort solution to be interior 
are common across technology and liability structure. 
 
Second-order Conditions for the first-mover firm under stackelberg 
For WL and SL the firm’s problem is, as in (1), to  
(A9)  *,WL,SLmin [1 ( ( )) ( )]
fx f c f f
x G x x H x P   
The first-order condition is  
(A10)  
*,WL,SL
*,WL,SL *,WL,SL
( )
1 ( ( )) ( ) ( ( )) ( ) 0.
c f
c f f c f f
f
dx x
G x x h x P g x x H x P
dx
    
A second-order sufficient condition is  
(A11) 
 
*,WL,SL
*,WL,SL *,WL,SL
2
*,WL,SL 2 *,WL,SL
*,WL,SL *,WL,SL
2
( )
2 ( ( )) ( ) ( ( )) ( )
( ) ( )
( ( )) ( ) ( ( )) ( ) 0.
c f
c f f c f f
f
c f c f
c f f c f f
f f
dx x
g x x h x G x x h x
dx
dx x d x x
g x x H x g x x H x
dx dx

 
    
 
 
When ( ) 1 c
x
cG x e
   and ( ) 1
fx
fH x e

   then the relationship may be written as  
(A12) 
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*,WL,SL *,WL,SL
*,WL,SL *,WL,SL
*,WL,SL
( ) ( )2
2
*,WL,SL 2 *,WL,SL
( ) ( )2
2
( )
2 1
( ) ( )
[1 ] [1 ] 0,
c f f c f f
c f f c f f
x x x x x xc f
f
x x x x x xc f c f
f f
dx x
e e e e
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Presently we cannot establish whether (A11) applies, but this is not very surprising as 
complementary technologies can often involve nonconvexities. 
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For WL and N the firm’s problem is, as in (1), to  
(A16)  min ( ) .
fx f f
x H x P  
The first-order condition is  
(A17)  1 ( ) 0.fh x P   
A second-order sufficient condition is ( ) 0fh x  , which is valid when ( ) 1
fx
fH x e

  . 
(A18)  *,BSmin ( ( )) ( ) .
fx f c f f
x G x x H x P  
From (37) we already know that *,BS 0fx  . 
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CHAPTER 5. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
The dissertation examines the impacts of various economic factors on consumers’ 
food related choices. The economic factors on consumer’s choices that we consider in this 
dissertation are habit forming behaviors of consumers, supplemental food policies and the 
uncertainty of food safety risk and strategic interaction with food processors. The dissertation 
is organized to include three stand-alone analyses, each investigating an independent subject 
on the consumer’s decision making process on food. Three topics are integrated in their 
common interest for understanding the influence of the consumer’s choices on food 
expenditures and efforts to improve food safety along with food processors. 
The first topic of this dissertation, presented in Chapter 2, investigates the effects of 
habit-forming behaviors on demand for dairy products using Nielsen 2009 and 2010 
HomeScan data. The largest effect of habit formation is shown in milk demand;  cheese 
demand rarely exhibits habit-forming behaviors. The own-price elasticities of each group are 
negative and smaller than unity which means that dairy products are necessary goods, just as 
we would expect. Having children and the total dairy expenditures both have substantial 
positive impacts on milk demand. According to my extensive reading of the literature, 
providing a dynamic uncensored demand on food applying a Bayesian method is one of the 
innovative and unique contributions of this study. In addition, this study can be a springboard 
for further discussion on the use of scanner data to analyze food demand and the empirical 
challenges faced from the censored nature of scanner data when dealing with dynamics in 
demand.  
In Chapter 3, the second topic of this dissertation, an empirical analysis is developed 
to evaluate the impact of participating WIC food program on whole grain products 
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expenditures at the household level. Using Nielsen 2008, 2009 and 2010 HomeScan data, we 
compare expenditures on whole grain products of WIC participating households to those of 
non-participating but eligible households. The results of the average treatment effect 
estimation show that the monthly average whole grain expenditures of households with at 
least one-year of WIC participation are significantly higher. The finding that WIC 
participating households purchase more whole grain products than non- participating eligible 
households is useful for evaluating the effectiveness of WIC program participation for 
developing healthful eating patterns. Furthermore, in terms of whole grain expenditures, this 
study may address the issue of recent policy change to the WIC food package which included 
the introduction of whole grain products to the packages. In order to see the WIC 
participation effect over the package changes, we use difference-in-difference propensity 
matching estimator and this provides us the result of the potential impact of the food package 
changes, as a positive policy shock. Using nearest neighbor matching, we observed the policy 
shock played an important role on purchasing whole grain rather than the treatment effect of 
WIC participation itself. On the other hand, the WIC participation effect was shown to be 
very strong even after getting rid of the shock impact when we adopted the Kernel and 
Radius matching procedure. 
The third topic of this dissertation, presented in Chapter 4, investigates the interaction 
between consumers’ effort and producers’ effort under the food safety risk. Food safety 
decisions are not made in isolation and food systems are linked in complex ways. This paper 
has considered a simple problem of strategic interaction between a single upstream food 
processor and a representative food consumer. We make use of the traditional modeling of 
expected utility maximization with self-protection incentive combining Stackelberg leader-
117 
 
 
follower competition setting under two legal compensation rules and two technologies on the 
occurrence of the food safety hazard event. We show how the food safety production 
technology and can matter, paying particular attention to penalties and extent of consumer 
risk aversion in determining equilibrium outcomes. We also compare with first-best and nash 
equilibrium to demonstrate that a role exists for leadership in policy interventions. We have 
several counterintuitive findings which have stemmed partly from the self-protective nature 
of food safety efforts. For example, a penalty and a minimum effort standard may do more 
harm than good while consumers may take less effort when they are more risk averse.  
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